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Abstract
This paper studies the gap in wealth between male and female single households using
2010 Household Finance and Consumption Survey data for eight European countries.
In the raw data, a large gap emerges at the upper end of the unconditional distribution.
While OLS estimates show no difference in average net wealth levels, quantile regres-
sions at the 95th percentile yield mixed evidence for the gender wealth gap in different
specifications. Labour market characteristics and participation in asset and debt cate-
gories largely explain the differences between male and female single households. The
gender gap in net wealth is driven by gaps in gross wealth and its components, but
is attenuated in four countries by gender gaps in (collateralized) debt. In the full
specification, the unexplained gap in gross wealth amounts to 27% in Slovakia, 33%
in France, 44% in Austria, 45% in Germany, and 48% in Greece.
JEL Classifications: D31; J16; E21
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1 Introduction
Research on the distribution of wealth has been fuelled by a recent surge of interest,
along with growing availability of high-quality micro-data. However, gender differences in
wealth have thus far not been a prominent topic in this research, some notable exceptions
notwithstanding (e.g. Deere and Doss, 2006, Schmidt and Sevak, 2006, Sierminska et al.,
2010). When contrasted to the gender pay gap, the gender wealth gap has received
little attention. Reasons for this research shortage on gender differences in wealth have
been the relative lack of wealth data compared to income data, and the difficulty in
untangling ownership information within households. Despite the difficulties in studying
wealth gaps by gender, the topic is highly relevant. Wealth is an important indicator
of well-being, because it constitutes economic prosperity in its own right, provides the
basis for future income generation via investments, brings social and political power, and
provides economic security when income flows are interrupted. Investigating the gender
gap in wealth is thus critical for understanding contemporary gender relations in the
economy.
This paper contributes to the literature by presenting the first cross-national study of
the gender wealth gap in eight European countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain,
France, Greece, Portugal, and Slovakia). It makes use of the Household Finance and
Consumption Survey (HFCS), a survey which is harmonized by the European Central
Bank. The HFCS contains household-level information on net wealth and its components,
real and financial assets, debt, as well as detailed socioeconomic characteristics that allow
us to control for a plethora of potential determinants of a household’s wealth.
While the HFCS enables researchers to take large strides in studying the distribution of
wealth by gender by providing harmonized data for many European countries, the fact that
the data are aggregated at the household level presents a challenge. Having data on the
wealth of households, not individuals, complicates the analysis of the distribution of wealth
by gender because household members may not have equal access to wealth (Sierminska
et al., 2010, Grabka et al., 2013) or decision-making power (Mader and Schneebaum, 2013).
This paper circumvents that problem by restricting the analysis to households with only
one adult, the female or male reference person (“female single households” and “male
single households”, respectively).
Findings are in line with the existing literature on gender differences in the wealth
distribution, mostly for the U.S., U.K., and Germany. A gender wealth gap exists at
the upper end of the unconditional distribution of net wealth in the raw data in each of
the eight countries. Across much of the distribution, however, there is little difference in
wealth ownership between male and female single households. Consequently, multivariate
analysis at the mean using OLS regressions fails to confirm a gender gap in net wealth.
More surprisingly, however, quantile regressions on net wealth at the top of the distri-
bution show mixed evidence of a gender “glass ceiling” in net wealth. In particular, we
find that labour market characteristics and participation in asset and debt categories go a
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long way towards explaining the differences in net wealth between male and female single
households. This leads us to look deeper, namely at the gender gap in gross wealth and
debt, the two constituent parts of net wealth and into their components. We uncover
that the distribution of these wealth components often differs substantially by gender, a
fact that was veiled in previous analyses that only looked at net wealth. Furthermore,
throughout the paper differences in historical trajectories, institutions, and social norms
that might play a role in shaping country differences in the gender wealth gap are dis-
cussed. Finally, we check the robustness of our findings by looking at gender differences in
occupational pension wealth, for which data are collected at the person level in the HFCS.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 gives an overview of
the theoretical and empirical background of gender differences in the accumulation and
distribution of wealth, section 3 presents the data, section 4 contains the empirical results,
first for net wealth (section 4.1) and then for its components (section 4.2), while section
4.3 performs a robustness check of the gender wealth gap using individual-level data on
pension wealth. Section 5 concludes.
2 Gender Differences in Wealth Accumulation
It is a well-established stylized fact that the distribution of wealth in Europe is highly
skewed, much more so than the distribution of income (Piketty, 2014, Rehm and Schnetzer,
2015). The distribution of wealth by gender, however, is not so clearly understood. As
discussed below, most existing studies find a gender wealth gap, that is, male households
have more wealth than female households. In order to assess potential determinants of
this gender wealth gap, the following model can be posited (adapted from Schmidt and
Sevak (2006), see also Sierminska et al. (2010)):
At+1 = (1 + rt)(At + Yt − Ct + Tt). (1)
That is, the household stock of assets A at time t + 1 is a function of the rate of return
(rt), the stock of assets (At), income earned (Yt), consumption (Ct), and wealth transfers
(Tt) such as inheritances, gifts, or asset division upon divorce, all at time t. Each of these
components may vary by gender as well as institutional and cultural context, thus leading
to differences in wealth accumulation.1
Income (Yt) differs by gender since women receive lower wages than men for the same
work (OECD, 2015). Furthermore, women’s income is lower than men’s since women are
more likely to face interruptions in their work histories (Gangl and Ziefle, 2009) and to
work in part-time jobs (Bardasi and Gornick, 2008, Matteazzi et al., 2014) as a result
of care and housework responsibilities. In addition, gendered sectoral and occupational
segregation has been demonstrated to have an important impact on earnings differences
1The initial level of wealth At is of course the sum of previous periods’ At+1, and its gender difference
is therefore dependent on the other components of equation 1.
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between men and women. Finally, the wealth accumulation patterns of the self-employed
differ from those of employees (Humer et al., 2015), and the gendered selection into these
two groups is thus likely to affect differences in wealth (Anna et al., 2000, Burke et al.,
2002, Kim et al., 2004). In general, women have less exposure to the structures that
enable wealth accumulation via wage income and are more often subject to the economic
penalties that result from child rearing (Denton and Boos, 2007, Chang, 2010, Ruel and
Hauser, 2013).
Consumption (Ct) may vary with age, which is most commonly captured by the life-
cycle hypothesis. The consumption smoothing assumed by the life-cycle hypothesis implies
the accumulation of wealth during phases of labour market activity and dissaving in times
of negative income shocks, but especially after retirement. Even though the high rate
of dissaving in retirement suggested by the life-cycle hypothesis is not unambiguously
observed in the empirical literature (Piketty et al., 2014), wealth holdings over age never-
theless tend to have a broadly inverted u-shaped form. Since women typically have higher
life expectancies than men, the life-cycle hypothesis would predict that women accumulate
higher levels of wealth (i.e. save more) during their active years. In this study, we focus
on the wealth of working-age (25-60 years) male and female single households; for this
group, the life-cycle hypothesis predicts higher saving by women when controlling for age.
At the same time, older and especially widowed women would be expected to have higher
inheritances than men as a result of the combined asset accumulation within the couple.
Transfers of wealth (Tt) comprise inheritances and inter-vivo transfers, as well as asset
separation upon divorce. Inheritances are a key factor in explaining wealth inequality
(Bowles and Gintis, 2002, Piketty et al., 2014), a fact which is also observed in the Eu-
ropean HFCS data used in this analysis (Fessler and Schürz, 2013, Leitner, 2015). The
distribution of inheritances has also become more unequal over time (Piketty, 2014). Ed-
lund and Kopczuk (2009) suggest that the share of women within the wealthiest 0.4%
of people in the U.S. may even serve as a proxy for the importance of inherited wealth
. However, the hypothesis that “men make, but women inherit great fortunes” does not
hold for the lower wealth groups (Edlund and Kopczuk, 2009). The case of gifts among
the living does not appear to be quite as clear-cut, since these tend to be given to liquidity
constrained children (Cox, 2003). Finally, upon divorce, only assets acquired during the
partnership are considered jointly owned in many European countries and thus divided
between partners; assets owned before marriage and inheritances are not split. Conse-
quently, the effect of divorce on the gender wealth gap may be less pronounced than that
of widowhood (Yamokoski and Keister, 2006, Sierminska et al., 2010).
Finally, the economic literature on gender routinely discusses a number of factors af-
fecting the rate of return (rt). First, differences in risk preferences and investment strategy
across genders have been thoroughly investigated in the literature, with most authors con-
firming their existence (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Recent research, however, casts doubt
on the widely held tenet that women are more risk averse than men (Nelson, 2015). The
gender gap in wealth at retirement persists in the U.S. even after accounting for risk pref-
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erences (Neelakantan and Chang, 2010). Second, the literature typically finds a gender
gap in financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008, Barasinska and Schäfer, 2013), which
could affect the gender wealth gap. The gender implications of other factors impacting the
rate of return, such as the distribution of capital income from wealth including imputed
rents (Fessler et al., 2015), differential returns which increase with the level of wealth
(Piketty, 2014), and intergenerational persistence in educational attainment (Schneebaum
et al., 2015) are fruitful avenues for future research.
The empirical research typically finds evidence of a gender wealth gap, i.e. women
owning less wealth than men (see the overview by Deere and Doss (2006) in the special
issue of Feminist Economics, and in Chang (2010)). Sierminska et al. (2010) and Ruel
and Hauser (2013) show that a gender wealth gap between men and women exists in
the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and in the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study,
respectively, which is largely driven by differences in labour market characteristics but
cannot be fully explained by covariates. Schmidt and Sevak (2006), in contrast, find
no overall gap in the raw data of the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID); a
gender wealth gap only emerges once household characteristics are controlled for. The
empirical studies of the gender wealth gap surveyed here focus on net wealth as their
outcome variable of interest (Deere and Doss, 2006, Schmidt and Sevak, 2006, Yamokoski
and Keister, 2006, Sierminska et al., 2010, Ruel and Hauser, 2013, Sierminska et al., 2015).
A fundamental issue in the empirical literature on the gender wealth gap is that wealth
data often come from household surveys, without information on the ownership of assets
across individual household members. Most papers discussed here therefore analyse wealth
at the household, not person, level. Important exceptions are Sierminska et al. (2010) and
Grabka et al. (2013), who use the 2007 German SOEP wealth module to analyse the
gender gap in net wealth at the person level, and Sierminska et al. (2015), who employ the
panel component of the SOEP to study the evolution of the determinants of the gender
wealth gap over time. Many studies therefore focus on households with only one adult to
compare male and female household wealth (e.g. Yamokoski and Keister, 2006, Schmidt
and Sevak, 2006).
This approach of analysing only households with one adult may be liable to selection
issues. Several aspects potentially affect the selection into single households by men and
women differently. First, women live longer than men. The age composition of single
households thus differs between men and women, and women are more likely to inherit
and thus have higher wealth. Second, women tend to marry at an earlier age than men. As
a consequence, for the entire population, the probability of being single at each age group
differs between men and women. This situation may have an effect on wealth, because
marriage has been found to increase wealth, independent of the other characteristics of the
household and its members (Ruel and Hauser, 2013). Third, preferences and/or constraints
regarding relationship status might differ between men and women. Whereas women might
be more likely to be divorced or widowed, men might tend to be more likely to be “never
married” or married (which includes having re-married after divorce). Again, the wealth
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effect of marriage could play out here. Fourth, career orientation might differ between
female and male single households, which may be linked to the choice to have children.
Women who are career-oriented might be more likely to choose to remain childless than
career-oriented men. The presence of children is also found to have an effect on wealth
accumulation (Yamokoski and Keister, 2006). Finally, social norms and customs regarding
household formation might differ by gender across countries. For instance, living in a
single-person household might be more common for young men than for young women
in some countries compared to others, or women might tend to move in with family or
friends at different rates than men following divorce or widowhood across countries.
The selection mechanisms into single households for men and women therefore need
to be taken into account. The existing literature on the gender wealth gap addresses this
issue explicitly or implicitly by truncating the sample according to the age of households
(Schmidt and Sevak, 2006, Warren, 2006), cohorts (Ruel and Hauser, 2013), or family
status (Sierminska et al., 2010). A second method of tackling selection bias is by using
Heckman selection models (Heckman, 1979). Such an approach consists of a two-stage
procedure of first estimating the probability of selecting into a group (here, single adult
households, as described below) and then using the results of that estimation as a predictor
of wealth. A third approach circumvents the selection issue of household-level data by
studying wealth components for which person-level data are available, typically pension-
related wealth. Warren (2006), for instance, shows that there is a gender gap in pension
wealth in the Family Resources Survey (FRS) of the U.K. both before and after controls
are included.
The data used in this paper contain information on wealth at the household level. We
limit our analysis to households with just one adult (“single households”) and focus on
eight European countries, Austria, Germany, Belgium, France, Greece, Spain, Portugal,
and Slovakia. We apply all the aforementioned strategies to minimize any selection bias
resulting from our household-level data: we restrict our sample to working age (25-60)
households, and we apply a Heckman selection model in estimating all our results. Fur-
thermore, we perform a robustness check using a wealth component, pensions, that is
available at the person level.
Since we are investigating eight European countries with different historical, legal, and
social backgrounds, norms and institutions (that cannot be captured with the available
data) might influence the results (Issac, 2007, European Central Bank, 2013a). In fact, a
key finding from the HFCS data is that households’ wealth is very heterogeneous across
countries (Andreasch et al., 2013). We address this issue by presenting the results for each
country separately and by briefly discussing the social norms and institutional background
that might explain the gender wealth gap in each country. For instance, social norms might
influence the decision to live alone. In countries in which independence is valued, indi-
vidual traits such as risk preference might play out more strongly to generate different
wealth outcomes between men and women than in countries in which family closeness
is appreciated and extended families live together. Regarding institutional backgrounds,
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several potential avenues of influence are touched upon in this paper. First, labour market
outcomes might be influenced by the availability and affordability of child care facilities.
Second, the legal framework surrounding divorce might lead to different gender wealth
gaps across countries. Third, taxation of wealth and inheritances varies across countries.
Fourth, since the main residence is often the main asset of private households, housing
policy has a large effect on wealth and thus potentially on the gender wealth gap. Fifth,
policies regarding pensions might lead to unequal incentives to accumulate across coun-
tries and between genders. Finally, banking practices and thus the potential for different
treatment of men and women seeking credit might vary across countries. We discuss each
of these issues below in the context of our empirical results. However, it should be noted
that the main focus of this paper is to investigate the gender wealth gap in eight European
countries. A detailed analysis of institutional factors influencing this gender wealth gap
thus needs to be relegated to future research.
3 Data Description
The 2010 Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) data used here to
test for differences in wealth between male and female single households contain detailed
household balance sheets as well as flow variables and a plethora of socioeconomic and
demographic variables. The HFCS data provide multiply imputed values for item non-
response, which we take into account in this paper by using Rubin’s Rule. All estimates
reported are calculated using survey and replicate weights provided in the HFCS. For a
detailed description of the survey, see the report by the European Central Bank (2013b).
The HFCS is ex-ante harmonized, yet important differences in cross-country compa-
rability remain. Possible issues in national comparisons may arise from variation in the
timing of fieldwork, which was conducted in 2009-11 in most countries; the treatment of
imputations; and data editing. Most notably for this paper, Cyprus, Finland, Malta, and
the Netherlands performed a substantial share of their survey through methods other than
computer assisted personal interviews (European Central Bank, 2013b). These differences
in interviewing technique may affect observed inequality. In addition, some countries sur-
veyed key variables differently. Italy only collected data on net income, from which gross
income was computed. Finland’s data do not contain any inheritances, and the incidence
of inheritances is implausibly low in Italy and the Netherlands (6.7% and 2.1% respec-
tively). Finally, Luxembourg and Slovenia have a small sample size, especially for single
households. For these reasons, we focus on eight out of 15 surveyed countries in this
analysis: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Greece, Portugal, and Slovakia.
Like most wealth surveys, the HFCS collects net wealth data on the household level,2
and the data do not contain information on the intra-household distribution of wealth
ownership. Empirical research has shown, however, that access to resources cannot be
2Certain wealth components, most notably occupational pension wealth, are available at the person
level in the HFCS. We study gender differences in this particular asset in Section 4.3 below.
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assumed to be equally distributed between persons within the household; women own less
of the household wealth (see e.g. Sierminska et al., 2010, Grabka et al., 2013). Simply
allocating household assets across household members is therefore likely to bias results
towards an underestimation of the gender wealth gap.
This paper thus investigates the wealth of what we call single male and single female
households, that is, households which have only one adult member.3 While they have only
one adult in the household, the single households in our sample may contain minors, i.e.
children under 16 years of age.
For comparison and to check for selection issues, we include all other (“non-single”)
households in our summary tables. In these households, the socioeconomic characteristics
of the survey respondent, which is the (self-selected) financially most knowledgeable person
in the household, are used where person-level characteristics are required.
Furthermore, this paper focuses on working-age adults, which also reduces selection
problems stemming from the differential life expectancies of men and women. We restrict
our sample to adults aged 25 to 60. In the case of non-single households, this age restriction
refers to the age of the reference person. Our full sample then comprises 36,362 households,
of which 5,188 are single households (2,808 female and 2,380 male).
For this paper, at the household level, net wealth and its components as well as gross
income and inheritances are of particular interest. In the HFCS, net wealth is generated
as the sum of the household’s assets valued at market prices, which comprise real and
financial assets, deducting the household’s liabilities, which are split into collateralized
(i.e. mortgage) and unsecured debt. Real assets include vehicles, the main residence,
further real estate property, valuables, and self-employment businesses; financial assets
include deposits, mutual funds, bonds, shares, managed accounts, non-self-employment
businesses, money owed to the household, and private pension plans; collateralized debt
consists of mortgages on the main residence or on other real estate property, and unsecured
debt of overdrafts, credit card debt, and other unsecured loans.4 The distribution of wealth
is highly right-skewed and contains zero and (in the case of net wealth) negative values.
We therefore smooth all continuous wealth, debt, and income variables using an inverse
hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation.5
Regarding the present value of inheritances, we follow Fessler et al. (2012) and Leitner
(2015) in conservatively assuming real value retention; our consumer price index (CPI)
data come from the AMECO database (European Commission, 2016). We use dummy
variables to distinguish between large and small inheritances, using the median level of
wealth of the respective country as the cut-off between the two. The reference category is
households which received no inheritance. The ownership of business assets (in the form of
3This limitation is to eliminate the cases in which a person lives in a household with wealth but is not
the owner of the wealth. Consider, for example, an adult living with his or her parents. The parents may
own wealth that the adult cannot access; we do not want to attribute that wealth to the individual. We
therefore focus our analysis on one adult (“single”) households.
4For a detailed discussion of asset valuation in the HFCS, see the European Central Bank (2013b) report
and for an in-depth analysis of issues in cross-country comparability, see Tiefensee and Grabka (2014).




publicly traded or non-traded business assets, with or without self-employment), owner-
occupied housing, collateralized debt (i.e. mortgages), and unsecured liabilities (credit
card debt, overdrafts, and other unsecured debt) are included in our analysis as dummy
variables.
At the person level, we make use of age, education, the number of children present,
relationship status, employment status, the hours worked per week, and the work/age
ratio of the respondent. We group age into three categories, namely 25-34, 35-44, and 45-
60 years. The HFCS provides four education categories, primary, lower secondary, upper
secondary and tertiary education, and we have dummy variables for each. The number of
children is categorized into zero, one, two, and three or more. Relationship status includes
never married, married (or living in a civil union), divorced, and widowed. Employment
status comprises seven mutually exclusive categories: 1. employees with and 2. employees
without a permanent contract; 3. self-employed without employees; 4. employers, i.e.
self-employed with employees; 5. unemployed; 6. out of labour force; and 7. retired. In
our estimates, we use a person’s work/age ratio to capture the share of one’s potential
working life actually spent working, which can thus be interpreted as historical labour
market attachment. It is calculated as the ratio of years during which a person worked
(for all or most of the year, as an employee or self-employed) since age 16, over the years
in which this person could have potentially worked, i.e. age minus 15. The work/age ratio
is thus bounded between 0 and 100%. The number of hours usually worked per week on
average over a year indicates current labour market attachment.6
Finally, the data on earnings give the sum of annual income in the previous twelve
months from gross employee, self-employment, and unemployment benefit income, includ-
ing gross income from public, occupational, and private pension plans. This variable is
also IHS transformed and used as an instrument in the selection model.
Table A1 in the Appendix gives an overview of the distribution of the control variables
for male and female single households, and for all other households (whose reference per-
son is also 25 to 60 years old) in the eight European countries studied here. Across all
countries, men and women in single households are younger than the reference person in
non-single (“other”) households: if all countries are combined, 47% of women and 46% of
men in single households are 45 to 60 years of age, which compares to 56% of the other
households. However, there are differences in age by gender between countries. Whereas
women living in single households are somewhat older than men in most countries, men in
single households are older than women in Germany (51% aged 45-60 versus 45%) and the
age structure is very similar for women and men in single households in Spain, Portugal,
and France. It is conceivable that there is cultural pressure for younger, older, and also
perhaps divorced individuals to live with their extended family rather than by themselves
in some countries such as Spain and Portugal, and that this social norm contributes to
age differences by gender across countries.
The differences in educational systems are evident in the cross-country data on single
6Weekly hours worked are not available for France.
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households. The share of men and women who completed only primary or lower secondary
education is comparatively high in Spain and especially Portugal, and in both countries
a larger share of males in single households has only finished those education levels. Aus-
tria and Germany, with their well-developed systems of vocational training, as well as
Slovakia, have high shares of secondary education. Especially in Germany and Slovakia,
there are notable differences between female and male single households (61% and 53% in
Germany, and 72% and 83% in Slovakia, respectively, have secondary education). Austria
and Germany are also the only countries where a larger share of male rather than female
single households holds a tertiary degree. Belgium has by far the highest share of tertiary
education for both women and men in single households, which amount to roughly 50%.
It is conceivable that the international community in Brussels influences this result.
Women living in single households are more likely than men in single households to
have children present. In all countries combined, 30% of female versus only 6% of male
single households have children. These stark differences hold for every country; only in
Belgium they are somewhat attenuated (around 25% of female versus 13% of male single
households have children). Other (non-single) household types are more likely to have
children present than single female and male households; 45% of these other household
types have a minor in their home.
Combining all countries, men in single households are more likely to have never been
married (65% compared to women’s 52%), whereas 32% of women but only 26% of men
are divorced, and 10% of women are widowed compared to 3% of men. 72% of other,
non-single households have a married reference person. Although magnitudes vary, this
pattern holds across all countries except for Belgium, where men and women in single
households are equally likely to have never been married (49%) and more men than women
are divorced. Furthermore, about 13% of both men and women in single households are
married in Belgium, which suggests again that either cultural factors or the multinational
community in Brussels might influence the sample.
Regarding labour market status in all countries, women are more likely than men
in single households to be employees with a permanent contract (55% versus 50% for
all countries combined). Only in Germany and Portugal is this pattern reversed. In
the combined sample of all countries, men in single households are more likely to be
self-employed (12%, compared to 6% of women), to employ others (5% of men versus
2% of women), and to be unemployed (by a small margin, 13% of men versus 12% of
women). Women in single households, on the other hand, are slightly more likely to
have a temporary contract (9% versus 8% of men) or to be out of the labour force (16%
versus 11% of men). This general picture is the same in all countries except for Germany,
where more men than women in single households are employed temporarily or are out
of the labour force, and in Portugal, where more women than men in single households
are unemployed. Combining all countries, non-single households also have high rates of
dependent employment (61%), but they have lower rates of unemployment (7%) than
single households. The exceptions here are Greece (44%) for dependent employment and
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France, Greece, and Portugal for unemployment.
More male single households have received an inheritance (31% versus women’s 28%) in
all countries combined.7 However, this pattern is reversed in Austria, Belgium, and Greece.
Men are also a bit more likely to have received a large inheritance in all countries except
for Belgium and Greece. On the other hand, a slightly larger share of women received a
low inheritance in five countries; the exceptions are Spain, Greece, and Portugal.
In terms of asset holdings, we see that male heads of single households are more likely
to own a business (24% versus female’s 13%) in all countries combined. This relation –
and even its rough magnitude – holds true for all countries. Non-single households have
higher ownership rates for businesses and main residences, as well as higher debt rates
than single households in all countries.
For owner-occupied housing, in contrast, very heterogeneous national ownership rates
are obscured by the equal prevalence (43%) for male and female households in the sample
of all countries. In the two countries with low ownership rates, Austria and Germany,
more males than females in single households own their main residence (27% and 21%,
respectively). In the other countries, ownership rates are higher among women (Greece
40%, Belgium 55%, France and Slovakia 63%) or roughly equal between genders (Portugal
about 50%, Spain 66%). Since Austria and Germany have large rental sectors and com-
paratively strong social housing policies, this finding provides some indication that such
institutions might have gendered effects.
The incidence of debt, again, varies a lot between countries despite similar aggregate
numbers for male and female single households (43%). In Austria, Germany, and France,
the incidence of total debt is similar between men and women; however, men have higher
rates of mortgages (at a low level in Austria and Germany), and women of unsecured
debt such as credit card debt and overdrafts. In Belgium, Spain, and Portugal, women
have a higher incidence of debt than men in single households; in Slovakia and in Greece
(except for mortgages), the situation is reversed. In all countries except for Greece and
Slovakia, more women than men in single households have unsecured debt such as credit
card debt and overdrafts. In Germany, with its large low-wage sector, and in Greece, which
experienced a stark economic crisis, these rates of unsecured debt are comparatively high
(43% for German women and 37% for Greek men in single households).
Men have stronger historical labour market attachment than women as measured by
the mean and median work/age ratio if all countries are combined. At the mean, men in
single households spent 75% of their potential working lives actually working, whereas this
value is 67% for women. However, this finding does not extend to Belgium, France, and
Slovakia, where male and female heads of single households have virtually equal labour
market attachment at the mean (60% in Belgium, 67% in France and Slovakia). One pos-
sible explanation is that national (historical) differences in norms and institutions around
7Note that inheritances do not always sum to one because a small share of households had inheritances
whose value we could not measure, because either the date or value of the inheritance was missing, or there
are no inflation data for the year in which the inheritance was received.
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childcare play a role in this finding. In Belgium and France the level of child care provision
is relatively high, with policy focusing on full coverage. Furthermore, in those two coun-
tries childcare services, including for very young children, are widely accepted. Slovakia,
on the other hand, had high child care coverage historically, but following the transition to
a market economy, Slovakia’s child care facilities experienced a clear downward tendency
the 1990s (Plantenga and Remery, 2009, Janta, 2014).
Current labour market attachment is also stronger for men than for women, as captured
by weekly working hours (31 for men versus 27 for women in single households at the
mean). This relation holds true for all countries, although both levels and the gap in
hours differ: on average, heads of female single households work between 20 hours in
Belgium and 31 in Greece. The difference in working hours at the mean between male
and female single households is 3 hours in Austria, and 8 in Greece and Portugal. Hours
worked are higher in non-single households at the mean and at the median compared to
single households.
Men living in single households have higher average earnings of about e26,000 per
year, compared to women’s e19,000 if all countries are combined. The HFCS data thus
show a raw gender gap in earnings of roughly 26% for our sample of male and female
single households. This gap varies from 8% in France to 33% in Germany. In addition,
the level of annual earnings differs vastly across the European countries studied here. On
average, female single households earn between roughly e7,000 in Slovakia and e25,000 in
Belgium. Average earnings levels of non-single households are lower than male but higher
than female single households’ earnings levels in all countries except for Germany and
Belgium, where the reference person in non-single households earns more.
All in all, we thus observe some systematic differences in our male and female samples
and in comparison to the non-single households, even after restricting the age of our sample
to the working age population. In particular, age, the presence of children, marital status,
home ownership, and earnings are of some concern to varying degrees in different countries.
It is therefore possible that there are differences in selection into single households between
women and men. As discussed in Section 4 below, we take this concern into account by
applying a Heckman selection model in our multivariate analyses.
Place table 1 here.
Table 1 gives an overview of the distribution of net wealth across household types and
countries. The share of male and female single households in the total population varies
substantially. In Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Slovakia, the shares of both male and female
single households are between 6% and 9% of the countries’ sample; in Austria, Belgium,
Germany, and France, their shares lie between 15% and 21%.
On average, female single households have lower net wealth than male single households
(e89,000 for females versus e130,000 males) if all countries are combined. That is, the
raw data show a gender wealth gap of roughly 32% at the mean. On the country level,
a positive raw gender wealth gap exists at the mean in each country except for Belgium,
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where female-headed single households have 6% more wealth than male-headed ones. The
magnitude of this gap is far from uniform; it amounts to 8% in Slovakia, 14% in Portugal
and 16% in Greece, 24% in France and 26% in Spain, and 48% in Austria and 49% in
Germany. Non-single households have higher net wealth than single households in all
countries and in the aggregate.
At the median, there is a positive raw gender wealth gap (i.e., wealth of male single
households exceeding female’s) of 19% if all countries are combined, but at the country
level the situation is much more mixed. Austria, Belgium, Spain, Greece, and Slovakia
report higher net wealth of female compared to male single households at the median.
The size of the gap varies substantially due to the lower absolute values of net wealth; this
negative gap is 9% in Slovakia, 12% in Austria, and 19% in Spain, but 141% in Belgium and
179% in Greece. The (positive) gender gap is 40% in Germany and Portugal. Net wealth
is virtually equal at the median in France between male and female single households.
Female single households have higher net wealth than male single households in several
instances at the bottom half of the distribution. In particular, at the first percentile,
women are more indebted than men in Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, and Portugal.
However, the differences in net wealth are small in absolute terms. Only in Belgium,
women have noticeably higher net wealth than men up to the 90th percentile.
The gender wealth gap becomes positive and large at the top of the distribution. At the
95th percentile, the raw gender net wealth gap is consistently positive, and its magnitude
ranges from 5% in Greece to 44% in Austria. At the very top of the distribution, the 99th
percentile, the gap widens even further, from 27% in Portugal to 66% in Germany. If the
relative gap is not calculated as the direct relation between male and female net wealth,
but rather as the difference in male and female single households’ net wealth relative to
the mean of male net wealth, then it amounts to roughly 150% in Austria and Germany,
between 90% and 100% in Spain, France, and Portugal, about 67% in Slovakia, 30% in
Belgium, and 15% in Greece at the 95th percentile. It thus appears that the higher net
wealth of male single households at the top of the distribution is driving the gender wealth
gap at the mean in the raw data.
Place figure 1 here.
Figure 1 investigates this point further by showing the gender wealth gap between male
and female single households across the net wealth distribution for all eight countries. In
most countries, there is very little difference in net wealth between male and female single
households across much of the distribution; the gap increases steeply only at the top end of
the distribution. Austria, Germany, Spain, France, Greece, and Slovakia conform to this
pattern, with very minor (often negative) wealth gaps across the distribution. Belgium is
the only country with a marked negative wealth gap in the upper half of the distribution.
Portugal has a few observations of female single households with very high wealth, which
impact the wealth gap at the top end. In part, this negative gap is driven by differences
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in the value of the main residence of male and female single households in Portugal (see
Figure 3, which we discuss below).
The magnitude of the absolute gap at the 95th percentile varies substantially; it ranges
from roughly e12,000 in Portugal to around e280,000 in Austria. The gap rises steeply
until the 99th percentile in all countries (except for the few households in Portugal), where
it lies between roughly e200,000 in Slovakia and e1,500,000 in Austria. The gender wealth
gap is thus clearly right-skewed in our raw data; male single households have higher net
wealth than female single households at the upper end of the wealth distribution.
This gap at the top of the unconditional distribution of net wealth is compounded
by the household composition of the wealth distribution in the European countries stud-
ied here, as the lowess graph in Figure 2 shows. The share of female single households
across the net wealth distribution shows an inverted u-shape, and in some cases a down-
right downwards-sloping pattern. The share of female households compared to male single
households peaks at the 1st decile in Germany and at the 3rd in Austria, the two distribu-
tions with the most pronounced inverted u-shape. Belgium, Greece, Spain, and Slovakia
peak around the 6th decile. Portugal and especially France show a downward sloping
distribution of female households across the entire net wealth distribution. That is, in
France, the relative incidence of female households strictly declines as net wealth rises. In
all eight countries, the share of female single households falls below 50% in the top decile.
Place figure 2 here.
4 Multivariate Analysis: The Gender Wealth Gap
This section presents the multivariate empirical findings on the gender wealth gap
in the eight European countries. Since the descriptive analysis showed that there is a
fairly large gap at the upper end of the net wealth distribution of single female and male
households despite very limited differences along most of the distribution, we attempt to
explain this gap with various personal- and household-level characteristics. To do so, we
first show the gender wealth gap in net wealth for the average single household by using an
OLS regression, sequentially adding covariates to the model. Second, we employ a quantile
regression at the 95th percentile of the net wealth distribution to examine the gender gap
for wealthier households. Third, we extend this analysis by looking into disaggregated
wealth categories as dependent variables; that is, we investigate the gender wealth gap in
gross wealth and its components (financial and real wealth), in debt and its constituent
parts (collateralized and unsecured debt), and then in even more detail in main residences.
Finally, we exploit the only data available on the individual level, namely occupational
pension wealth, to show gender differences in this wealth category as a robustness check
in Section 4.3.
As discussed in Section 3, the selection into single households is likely to be driven by
different aspects for men and women. In particular, we observed differences in age between
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men and women in single adult households, their relationship status, career orientation
as indicated by the presence of children, home ownership, and earnings. The degree of
these differences varies by country, but at least one of these characteristics differs greatly
by gender in each country (and in comparison to households with more than one adult,
or “non-single” households in Table A1 in the Appendix). We thus attempt to control for
the selection into a single household as a potential determinant of wealth by using these
characteristics in the first step of a two-stage Heckman selection correction procedure,
as shown in Equation 2. The probability Prob of being single for each household i in
country j is estimated, controlling for a household gender dummy variable, a vector X of
age, relationship status, the presence of children,8 ownership of the main residence, and
earnings – all of which are also interacted with the gender dummy –, and including an
error term ij :
Probij = φijFemaleij + χijXij + ψijXij ∗ Femaleij + ij . (2)
Having obtained the probability of being a single household Probi for households in
each country j, we calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). This is the ratio of the prob-
ability density function to the cumulative distribution function of the distribution of the





Included in the selection model (Equation 2), but not in the models predicting wealth
below, is our instrument of earnings. Earnings can affect the probability of being a single
household, because living alone requires a certain regular income stream – in a sense, one
needs to be able to “afford” living in a single household. Furthermore, a well-established
literature shows that having her own income often enables a woman to leave a bad re-
lationship and live alone (e.g. Andress and Hummelsheim, 2009, Fernandez and Wong,
2014). Finally, given the literature indicating that other economic characteristics, such as
inheritances, are more important in determining wealth than income (Fessler and Schürz,
2013, Leitner, 2015), we are comfortable leaving earnings out of the wealth equation.
The results of the selection model are reproduced in Table A2 in Appendix A.2. Two
important findings should be mentioned here, one regarding variables and one concerning
countries. With respect to variables, the selection model shows that being married, having
one child in the household (except in Austria), and owning a home decreases the probability
of living in a single household in all eight countries for men and women. These lower
probabilities of living in a single household are attenuated for women in many cases.
Regarding countries, we find almost all selection variables to be statistically significant
in France and to a lesser extent in Belgium and Slovakia. The selection process into
single households thus appears to be captured particularly well in these countries by the
8We combine the variables “two” and “three or more children present” for this estimation due to a low
number of observations in the latter, especially when split by gender.
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quantifiable characteristics covered here. It is possible that individual attitudes such as
independence and risk-taking might be more similar for men and women in these countries.
In other countries, however, we conjecture that social norms and conventions might play
more of a role, such as social pressure to live in larger households for elderly or young
persons (Fokkema and Liefbroer, 2008). Overall, these results suggest that there are indeed
differences in selection into single households. We therefore report the selection parameter
IMR for the Inverse Mills Ratio in the OLS results and in the quantile regressions below.
4.1 The Gender Gap in Net Wealth
In this section, we show the results of the OLS and quantile regression models for each
of the eight countries. We regress the IHS-transformed level of net wealth NW for each
household i in country j on a constant, a household gender dummy variable, a vector of
k controls in X, the Heckman correction term IMR, and an error term ε:
NWij = αj + β1jFemaleij + βjkXjik + γjIMRij + εij . (4)
Control variables are subsumed in four groups: personal characteristics (age and educa-
tion), family structure (number of children present and relationship status), inheritances,
and labour market attributes and asset ownership (employment characteristics, business
and housing assets, and debt). The control group comprises male single households aged
35 to 44 with lower secondary education, who are married (or living in a civil union) with
no children living in the household, who did not receive an inheritance, work as an em-
ployee with a permanent contract, and own neither their main residence, business assets,
nor debt.
Place table 2 here.
Table 2 contains the results for the OLS model when the control variables are added
sequentially. For readability, it includes only the coefficient for living in a female single
household and the selection parameter.9 Since the gender gap in net wealth at the mean is
not very pronounced as Table 1 and Figure 1 illustrated, we do not expect a strong gap to
emerge from the OLS. Table 2 shows that in most countries, there is indeed no statistically
significant gender wealth gap in any specification, from the base model (1), which includes
no controls beyond the Heckman correction term to the full model (5). However, there
are some exceptions. In Slovakia, there is a statistically significant gender wealth gap if
family controls are included (model 3), and in Spain, there is a statistically significant gap
if we control for family structure and inheritances (models 3 and 4). Only Portugal shows
a statistically significant gender wealth gap starting in the base model (1) and throughout
all specifications, including inheritances (model 4). When the set of independent variables
for labour market and assets is added for the full model, we do not find a gender gap in
9For detailed results, refer to Tables A3 to A10 in Appendix A.3.
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net wealth in any of the eight countries analysed here. The explanatory power of the full
model (5) is comparatively high; it is between 33% in France and 58% in Slovakia.10
In all countries, the selection term IMR is statistically significant in at least one specifi-
cation, confirming that selection into single households does appear to differ for males and
females, and that the characteristics relevant to this selection are also related to wealth.
In Austria, Spain, Greece, and Slovakia, it has an effect in specifications (1) through (4),
i.e. the base model, when age and education are included, when family structures are
added, and when the model controls for inheritances. In the other countries, the selec-
tion parameter is not statistically significant when control set (2), age and education, is
included, and significance is irregular otherwise. When the economic characteristics of
labour market and assets are added for the full model (5), the selection parameter is not
statistically significant in any country except Germany. We conjecture that controlling
for home ownership explicitly in the full model might be driving this result. This would
suggest that the decision to live alone is strongly influenced by housing, and in particular
by owning one’s main residence.
We thus do not find much evidence of a gap in average net wealth between male and
female single households in the full OLS specification. This is not very surprising, since
the raw data of Table 1 and Figure 1 did not give a strong indication of a gender gap in
average net wealth. It is therefore likely that these differences at the mean level of wealth
miss important details about the gender wealth gap, given the fact that the distribution
of net wealth is highly right-skewed in each of the eight countries, as is the raw gender
gap in net wealth.
We therefore conduct a quantile regression at the 95th percentile of the net wealth
distribution, in order to assess the gender gap at the top of the distribution.11 Table 3
presents the coefficients on being a female single household and on the selection parameter.
Place table 3 here.
The coefficient for being female is consistently negative at the top of the net wealth
distribution; however, the statistical significance of the gender gap in net wealth varies
substantially across countries and across our first four models. The gender wealth gap at
the top of the distribution is statistically significant in the raw data of the base model (1)
in three countries (Austria, Spain, and France). When personal characteristics of age and
education are taken into account in model (2), only France retains a significant gender
wealth gap. Three countries show a gender wealth gap with family controls in model
(3) (Germany, Portugal, and Slovakia). Including inheritances in the controls yields five
countries with a statistically significant gender wealth gap (Austria, Germany, Greece,
10The R2 in the multiply imputed data is calculated as the average of the R2 over the five implicates in
the data set.
11A limited number of observations and consequent sensitivity to variations prevent us from investigating
the very top of the distribution, even though the raw data suggests that the gap widens towards the 99th
percentile.
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Portugal, and Slovakia), suggesting that female single households receive larger inheri-
tances: once comparing male and female single households with the same distribution of
inheritances, female single households have lower wealth than male single households, i.e.
the net wealth gap becomes larger (except in Portugal) and statistically significant. This
finding is in line with the literature on gender differences in inheritances among the rich
(Edlund and Kopczuk, 2009).
The size of the gender wealth gap is economically significant; its smallest value is 25%
in the raw data in France which rises to 33% in model (2).12 Austria and Germany have
somewhat larger gender wealth gaps at the top of the distribution, which amount to almost
90% in Germany and over 100% in Austria in model (4). Slovakia’s gender wealth gap
in model (4), controlling for inheritances, is about 70%; Greece’s about 63%. In general,
the gender wealth gap increases as more control variables are included. Only Portugal’s
decreases from over 50% to less than 45% from model (3) to model (4).
The sporadic significance of the gender gap in net wealth with few immediately ob-
vious commonalities in the first four models suggests that institutional differences and
social norms might play a role in shaping these results. For instance, the three coun-
tries in which the gender wealth gap is significant when family controls are included in
model (3), Germany, Portugal, and Slovakia, have rather weak child care institutions.
Full-time childcare services are scarce in Germany and Portugal, and high costs hamper
uptake in Slovakia (Janta, 2014). Furthermore, of the five countries in which control-
ling for inheritance (model 4) yields a statistically significant gender wealth gap (Austria,
Germany, Greece, Portugal, and Slovakia), three (Austria, Portugal and Slovakia) have
no inheritance taxation, and the other two countries (Greece and Germany) have very
low inheritance taxation (Ey, 2014). Whereas a causal interpretation is not possible with
these data, it is not implausible that norms and institutions affect the differences between
female and male single households at the top of the distribution.
Finally, in the full model (5), female single households do not have statistically signif-
icant lower wealth than male single households in any of the eight Euro area countries.
That is, even though we do find some evidence of a gender gap in net wealth in the raw
data or with limited sets of controls at the top of the distribution in most countries, these
differences are explained by labour market characteristics and participation in certain asset
and debt categories.
The significance of the IMR shows that we are effectively capturing the difference in
selection into single households in five countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, and
Greece. It thus does indeed appear to be the case that the factors included in the selection
model are related to wealth as well as the choice to live alone in at least some countries. In
particular, we conjecture that individual attitudes and social norms such as independence
and risk-taking might affect both the decision to live alone and the wealth level of single
households in those countries. This view might be supported by the fact that we detect
12Note that since the IHS transformation approximates the logarithmic function for all but very small
values, coefficients can be interpreted analogously to logarithmic models (Pence, 2006).
17
no selection bias in model (5) when labour market effects and assets are controlled for in
seven countries.13
Portugal, Spain, and Slovakia seem unaffected by selection issues. These three coun-
tries have the lowest share of single male and female households (together with Greece,
see Table A1 in the Appendix). It is conceivable that there are social norms in these
countries which induce the formation of larger households such as early marriage, living
with parents longer at a young age, or living with adult children in older age. This pos-
sibility is in line with the literature which finds that living alone is much more common
in Northern and Western Europe than in either Southern or Eastern Europe at all ages.
Especially during young and middle adulthood, the percentage of men and women living
alone is particularly low in Southern European countries (Fokkema and Liefbroer, 2008).
Regarding the effects of covariates, the control variables largely show the expected
effects found in the literature (Schmidt and Sevak, 2006, Yamokoski and Keister, 2006,
Sierminska et al., 2010), conditional on statistical significance (see the appendix A.4 for
results and in-depth discussion). Youth, seniority, and education have the expected effects.
So does marital status – never having been married, or being divorced or widowed go hand
in hand with higher wealth in single households (with the exception of Slovakia in model
5). Single households at the top of the distribution in which there are children present
have lower wealth. Large inheritances play an important role; they retain their statistical
significance even in the full model in five countries. Temporary contracts, unemployment,
work history (the work/age ratio) and employing others have the expected effects. Home
and business ownership are positively correlated with wealth, but not surprisingly, at the
top of the distribution debt (both collateralized and unsecured) has little correlation with
wealth.
To sum up, as expected, we do not find a gender wealth gap at the mean for the
eight European countries investigated here. Possibly more surprisingly, there is only a
somewhat scattered incidence of a statistically significant gender gap in net wealth at the
95th percentile, and it is explained by gender differences in labour market characteristics
and participation in asset and debt categories in all eight countries. Where it can be
confirmed, the gap in net wealth is economically significant; it ranges from 25% in France
to over 100% in Austria in different specifications of the controls. We effectively control
for selection, especially in countries where it can be conjectured that individual attitudes
and social norms such as independence and risk-taking play a more important role in the
decision to live in a single-adult household. Furthermore, we are able to corroborate the
existing literature regarding the influence of other covariates on net wealth. In particular,
age, education, the presence of children, marital status, inheritances, home and business
ownership, temporary contracts, unemployment, and employing others have the expected
signs. The next section analyses components of net wealth to investigate the possible
reasons for the far less than uniform statistical significance of the gender gap in net wealth
at the top of the distribution.
13The exception is Belgium.
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4.2 The Gender Gap in the Components of Net Wealth
The previous section (4.1) established that even at the top of the distribution, the
evidence for a gender gap in net wealth across countries and model specifications is mixed,
even though the raw data shows a clear gap. This section thus presents an extension
which investigates the gender gap in various components of net wealth. In particular, it
starts with an analysis of gross wealth and its two components (real and financial wealth),
continues with debt, where we delve deeper into collateralized and unsecured debt, and
concludes with a brief look at main residences.
Figure 3 gives a first overview of these asset and debt categories. Important variations
by country and category notwithstanding, which are discussed in detail below, it shows
that the gap between male and female single households is situated at the top of the
distribution in all cases. We therefore continue to focus on this segment in the multivariate
analysis of this section.
Place figure 3 here.
Table A19 in the appendix shows the results of a quantile regression predicting the
value of gross wealth owned by female versus male single households at the 95th percentile
of the gross wealth distribution. The coefficient on female single households is negative
across the board; compared to the quantile regression of net wealth, however, the gender
gap in gross wealth is statistically significant in many more specifications. In particular,
we find a statistically significant gender gap in gross wealth that we did not detect for
net wealth in the first four models in Spain (models 2 and 4), France (models 3 and
4), Greece (models 1, 2, and 3), and Slovakia (models 1 and 2). In the full model (5),
five countries (Austria, Germany, France, Greece, and Slovakia) now show a statistically
significant gender gap for gross wealth, where no country had done so for net wealth.
Only in Germany does the gender gap lose statistical significance in two instances (model
3 and 4) when predicting gross wealth compared to net wealth, and in Belgium the gender
wealth gap remains statistically insignificant in all specifications.
The size of the gender gap in gross wealth varies significantly across countries, from
less than 30% in Slovakia in model (5) to almost 80% in Austria in model (4). Although
the non-universal statistical significance makes it difficult to discern patters, in some cases
the gender wealth gap follows an inverted u-shaped pattern across the five specifications.
That is, the size of the unexplained gap increases as personal and family characteristics
are controlled for, and then decreases when inheritances and especially labour market
characteristics and asset/debt holdings are included. This is the case in Austria, France,
and Portugal.
For all countries, the gender wealth gap shrinks when controls for labour market char-
acteristics and asset/debt holdings are added. This finding reconfirms the importance of
labour market outcomes and asset/debt holdings in explaining a part of the gender wealth
gap. At the same time, the range of the gap size across countries is notably compressed.
19
In the full model, the gap in gross wealth now takes values from the above-mentioned 27%
in Slovakia to around 33% in France, 44% in Austria and 45% in Germany, to 48% in
Greece. Finally, we find that selection issues continue to be present while studying gross
wealth. The country-specific patterns for the IMR found in Table 3 are broadly confirmed.
Next we look at the two components of gross wealth, real and financial wealth. Both
show a gender gap that is strongly statistically significant. In particular, real wealth is
very similar to gross wealth, both regarding statistical significance and the size of the gap
between female and male single households (see Table A20 in the Appendix). The only
difference to gross wealth is in a single instance of statistical significance in Belgium (model
4) with a gap of about 24%, and that the gender gap in real wealth is not statistically
significant in any model in Germany. Since real wealth, and especially housing, is the
most important asset category for most households, this close link to gross wealth is to
some extent to be expected.
Financial wealth, on the other hand, shows some peculiarities, as Table A21 in the
Appendix shows. There is a gender gap in financial wealth at the top of the distribution
of single households that is statistically significant in most model specifications in Germany
and Austria, as well as in France, Greece and Portugal, and to a lesser degree in Spain,
whereas Belgium and Slovakia do not show evidence of a gender gap in financial wealth.
A possible explanation of the differences in the findings regarding the gender gap in
net wealth versus gross wealth and its components is based on the fact that net wealth is
gross wealth minus debt. As noted above, Spain, France, Greece, and Slovakia, as well as
Germany, have notable differences in the statistical significance in the gender gaps of gross
and net wealth. These are countries with a high incidence of debt in the full population
(see Table A1 in the Appendix). In particular, single households in Spain, France, and
Portugal have comparatively high levels of collateralized debt, while Greece and Germany
have higher levels of unsecured debt.14 It is therefore possible that the observed gender
gap in gross wealth is diminished sufficiently to render it statistically insignificant for net
wealth, because debt is taken into consideration implicitly. We therefore explicitly consider
the gender gap in debt next.
Table A22 shows that the coefficients on female households are indeed virtually uni-
formly negative in a quantile regression for debt at the 95th percentile, meaning that there
is a gender gap in debt (i.e., men hold more debt) which might dampen the gap in net
wealth. However, whether the gender gap in debt is statistically significant in multivariate
analysis is highly country-specific; this is the case in Spain, France, and Portugal in all
five specifications. These three are countries with a high share of home ownership (Pit-
tini et al., 2015), and especially in Spain there was a house price bubble (Lourenco and
Rodrigues, 2014) which might have impacted the level at which mortgages were taken out
at the top of the distribution. In fact, it is conceivable that in the run-up to the crisis,
14Belgium also has relatively high levels of debt incidence, in particular unsecured debt (see Figure 3),
but does not have a statistically significant gender wealth gap in either net or gross wealth. Apart from
potential data problems related to low numbers of observations at the top of the distribution, we conjecture
that the international community in Brussels might have an impact here.
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gendered lending practices (Hertz, 2011) interacted with gender stereotypes about risk
aversion (Nelson, 2015) to magnify gender differences in indebtedness. In the other five
countries, we do not detect statistically significant differences in indebtedness by gender
at the top of the distribution.
To examine the gender gap in debt more closely, we look into gender differences in the
ownership of different kinds of debt next. Gender differences in collateralized debt is shown
in Table A23 in the Appendix, which reveals that male and female single households do in
fact differ in this sub-category. As with total debt, near-universal negative coefficients on
female single households are accompanied by statistical significance that is clustered in four
of the eight countries – Spain, France, Portugal, and Slovakia. In three of these countries,
we found significant differences in the gender gap in gross and net wealth. In the other two
countries that showed differences in the gender gap between net and gross wealth, Greece
and Germany, unsecured debt might play a role. It is indeed more prevalent in the entire
population of single households in these two countries (see Table A1 in the Appendix) and
at the top of the distribution in Germany (see Figure 3). This might be linked to Greece’s
severe economic crisis (e.g. Lane, 2012) and to Germany’s large low-income sector (e.g.
OECD, 2014). However, in multivariate analysis of the top of the distribution, gender
differences in unsecured debt do not appear to play an important role; it is statistically
significant only in Austria and in Slovakia in some specifications, as Table A24 in the
Appendix shows. Since unsecured debt comprises overdrafts, credit card debt, and similar
unsecured debt forms, it might not be too surprising that the multivariate analysis shows
little evidence of gender differences at the upper end of the distribution. Taken together,
these findings appear to indicate that in four countries (Spain, France, Portugal, Slovakia),
it is the difference in the likelihood of owning collateralized debt between male and female
single households which drives our finding that female single households have less gross
wealth, but not net wealth, than male single households when covariates are controlled
for.
Since owner-occupied housing is typically the most important asset category for pri-
vate households, and since we established gender differences in collateralized debt (i.e.,
mortgages) which are directly linked to the ownership of real estate, we also investigate
whether there are gender differences in the value of male and female single household’s
main residences. Table A25 in the Appendix does indeed provide evidence for a gender
gap in main residences. In particular, female single households hold between 17% (model
(4) in Belgium) and 77% (model (3) in Germany) less wealth in the value of their main
residences than male single households. Three countries show broad statistical significance
of the gender gap in main residences: Belgium, Germany, and Slovakia. In Belgium, the
value of the main residence is the only wealth category in which we observe a gender
wealth gap – here the value of men’s single household’s homes is between 16% and 26%
higher than women’s at the top of the distribution. In Germany, there is a gender gap of
54% to 77% in the value of single household’s main residences, and in Slovakia, it ranges
from 40% to 51%. Both Germany and Slovakia were affected by historical policies fol-
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lowing the transition to market economies regarding home ownership: in East Germany,
most residents in formerly state-owned housing were moved to rental contracts, whereas
in Slovakia, they were given the opportunity to purchase their homes on favourable terms
(Andreasch et al., 2013). Whereas home ownership rates differ substantially between those
two countries as a consequence (see Table A1 in the Appendix), it is not unthinkable that
both policies had unintended effects on relative home ownership between women and men.
Taken together, the results presented in this section suggest that the gender gap in
net wealth at the top of the distribution of single households, which we identified in the
raw data, is often driven by differences in gross wealth. In Spain, Portugal, France, and
Slovakia, a gender gap in (collateralized) debt dampens the gender gap in net wealth suf-
ficiently for it to become only sporadically statistically significant in multivariate analysis.
As discussed, this may be related to gendered effects of housing policies in three of these
countries.
Greece has a high incidence of both home ownership and unsecured debt over the
entire population of single households, as well as a notable difference in the gender gap
of gross and net wealth. The severe economic crisis might provide an explanation of why
unsecured debt is prevalent in the general population while at the same time, female single
households are more indebted than male single households at the top of the distribution.
In Austria and Germany, there is a gender wealth gap of 73% (Germany in model 3)
to 107% (Austria in model 4) in net wealth in models which do not control for differences
in labour and asset holdings, and a gross wealth gap of about 44% in both countries in
the full model. In these countries, financial wealth and differences in the value of the
household’s main residence (as well as unsecured debt in Austria) appear to be behind
the net and gross wealth gaps in single households at the top of the distribution. It is
possible that exit rates (i.e., the probability of leaving owner-occupied housing following
a divorce) in the context of a well-developed rental and social housing sector are a factor
contributing to these results. Among single female households, Austria has the highest
share of divorcees (see Table A1 in the Appendix), and it also has the highest exit rate in
comparison to 11 other European countries comprising all of our countries except Slovakia
(Dewilde, 2009).
Belgium is the only country which did not show any gender gap in net or gross wealth
at the 95th percentile. A closer analysis of particular types of wealth shows, however, that
there is a gender wealth gap in the value of the household’s main residence in Belgium.
It is conceivable that the presence of a large international community in Brussels affects
these results.
4.3 Individual-Level Pension Wealth
This section checks the robustness of the results obtained in Section 4.1. Like many
other wealth surveys, the HFCS contains one wealth component at the individual level, oc-
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cupational pension wealth.15 This variable is available in six countries (Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Spain, France, and Slovakia) for all men and women in the sample, regardless
of their household living arrangements. It thus allows us to present the gender wealth gap
in occupational pension wealth for the entire population (similar to e.g. Warren (2006)
and Neelakantan and Chang (2010)).
Pension wealth is almost per definition strongly correlated with age. Table 4 thus
shows the average level of occupational pension wealth of all women and men for three
age groups for the sample as a whole, for all deciles, and the tails.
Place table 4 here.
Occupational pension wealth is, of course, a very narrow aspect of wealth, which is
likely to vary substantially across countries according to the organization of their pension
system. Nonetheless, there is a gender gap in occupational pension wealth in the vast
majority of cases. In general, the older and the higher up in the distribution, the more
pervasive and the larger becomes the gender gap in occupational pension wealth in most
countries. In Germany, and in some instances across the net wealth distribution in Spain
and in France, women have higher occupational pension wealth than men in the youngest
age group (25-34 years). However, as the level of pension wealth and age increases, the
familiar structure of a gender gap in occupational pensions re-establishes itself.
There are some exceptions. In Germany and in Spain, women have higher occupational
pension wealth than men in the top percentile of the net wealth distribution. In Spain,
the sporadic reverse gap in the youngest age group extends to the middle age group (35-44
years) in the upper half of the distribution, a pattern which is mirrored by Austria.
The size of the wealth gap in pensions varies considerably across countries and may
reflect idiosyncrasies in pension systems. For instance, in Slovakia, the short time period
for accumulation in a market economy is reflected in generally low levels of occupational
pensions, an inverse u-shaped pattern of occupational pension levels across age groups,
and comparatively smaller gender gaps. This might also be related to a mandatory sec-
ond pillar introduced in 2005 (Wilmington, 2014). Belgian men, at the other end of the
spectrum, own the highest occupational pensions across much of the net wealth distribu-
tion. Women in Belgium, however, are faced with a relative gender gap between around
20% and 80%, and thus in many deciles on average own less occupational pension wealth
than, for instance, German women. Among the countries studied here, Belgium seems
to be the only country with three effectively equal pillars of a pension system since a
scheme of sectoral complementary pensions was introduced in 2003 to further extend the
occupational pillar (OECD, 2013). Furthermore, the workforce covered by occupational
pension is relatively high in Belgium, with 75% of workers covered, compared to Austria,
for example, with just 30% (PensionsEurope, 2012).
These data thus permit a – highly tentative – conclusion that the gender wealth gap for
single households appears to broadly persist at the individual level for the entire population
15Data on private pensions were collected only in Slovakia in the first wave of the HFCS.
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in the Euro area, at least for occupational pension wealth. However, a more detailed
analysis of the pension systems in the countries studied here, in particular the interplay of
the other two pillars of the pension system (public and voluntary private pension plans),
would be required for more substantiated insights into the gender gap for this wealth
component.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
It is well documented that wealth is unevenly distributed, but gender differences in
wealth remain under-studied, especially in cross-country comparisons. This is the first
paper to examine the gender wealth gap in multiple European countries (Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Spain, France, Greece, Portugal, Slovakia). It uses the Household Finance and
Consumption Survey of the European Central Bank to test for gender differences in wealth
in working-age (25-60 years) “single” households consisting of only one adult, male or
female.
The raw data show little difference in the net wealth owned by single households across
much of the distribution. Only at the top of the unconditional distribution of net wealth
does a substantial difference between genders appear. Consequently, an OLS analysis
does not show an unexplained gap in average net wealth between male and female single
households in the full specification. Somewhat more surprisingly, quantile regressions at
the upper end of the distribution (95th percentile) yield mixed evidence for a gender gap
in net wealth.
Where it can be confirmed statistically, the gender gap in net wealth is economically
significant; it ranges from 25% in France to 100% in Austria in different specifications of
the control variables. Furthermore, covariates show the expected signs. Youth, seniority,
education, and marital status have the expected effects. Children are correlated nega-
tively and inheritances positively with wealth of single households. Wealth rises with the
ownership of certain asset classes, but the holding of debt is statistically insignificant.
In order to investigate the gender wealth gap in more detail, this paper looked beyond
differences in net wealth to the individual components of wealth. Differences in gross
wealth appear to drive the gender gap in net wealth at the top of the distribution. The
size of the gender gap in gross wealth is compressed across countries, and at the full spec-
ification it amounts to 27% in Slovakia, 33% in France, 44% in Austria, 45% in Germany,
and 48% in Greece. However, in four countries – Spain, France, Portugal, and Slovakia –
a gender gap in (collateralized) debt dampens the gender gap in net wealth sufficiently to
render its statistical significance patchy in multivariate analysis. Unsecured debt might
play a role in Greece (negatively) and Germany (positively), although quantile regressions
detect little statistical significance for this debt component at the top of the distribution.
Since data are available only at the household level, selection into single households
may be a concern. The descriptive analysis suggests that there are systematic differences
in the characteristics of female and male single households, and that the mechanisms
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affecting selection into being a single household (and thus in our sample) may be related
to age, the presence of children, relationship status, home ownership, and earnings. We
follow the literature in truncating our sample by age, and we apply a Heckman selection
model in all our results. In addition, we perform a robustness check using occupational
pension wealth, for which person-level data are available.
The country level differences in the gender gap in net wealth are likely to be affected
by historical trajectories, institutions, and social norms. For instance, selection into single
households, as well as wealth, might be driven less strongly by individual traits such as risk
preference in countries where large family systems are the norm. This paper provided a
brief discussion of country differences in availability and affordability of child care facilities,
the legal framework surrounding divorce, taxation of wealth and inheritances, housing
policies, pension systems, and banking practices where they might explain differences in
the gender wealth gap across countries.
The work presented here has answered some important questions regarding the gender
wealth gap in eight European countries, but opened the door to several others. First, it
is clear that the availability of data measuring wealth at the individual level, such as in
the German Socio-Economic Panel (Wagner et al., 2007), would be useful in measuring
a gender wealth gap for the entire population. Second, a more in-depth analysis of the
effect of institutional differences on the gender wealth gap would be a fruitful avenue for
future research. Third, research on the mechanisms which determine wealth accumulation
and how they differ for women and men would be useful, either by analysing panel data
(as in the preliminary work of Sierminska et al. (2015)) or in a cross-cohort analysis. Just
as studying pay gaps by gender tells us a great deal about the structure of our society
and economy, a greater understanding of wealth gaps by gender will illuminate the ways
in which wealth is intertwined with economic and social outcomes.
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Difference in net wealth
Notes: This graph shows the gender gap across the unconditional distribution of net wealth of single female
households. Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
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Notes: This graph shows the lowess-smoothed share of female in all single households across the uncondi-
tional distribution of net wealth of female single households. Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
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Table 2: Net wealth gap of single households at the mean (OLS)











Female 0.672 0.899 -0.200 -0.047 0.630
(0.586) (0.572) (0.706) (0.690) (0.722)
IMR 1.806*** 1.850*** 9.856*** 7.912*** 3.677
(0.488) (0.548) (2.775) (3.010) (3.066)




m Female 0.099 0.097 -0.122 -0.146 0.023(0.490) (0.419) (0.433) (0.436) (0.422)
IMR 1.516** 1.051 5.952*** 5.766*** -0.328
(0.677) (0.667) (1.026) (1.012) (1.170)





y Female -0.884 -0.602 -1.059 -0.909 -0.239
(0.904) (0.872) (0.825) (0.886) (0.913)
IMR 0.831 0.783 11.253*** 9.296*** 5.983***
(1.082) (1.004) (1.869) (1.838) (2.186)




Female -0.395 -0.651 -1.520** -1.213* -0.272
(0.642) (0.615) (0.679) (0.652) (0.591)
IMR 1.991* 2.101* 6.150*** 5.147*** -2.592
(1.032) (1.144) (1.795) (1.649) (1.916)




Female -0.128 -0.343 0.212 0.199 -0.063
(0.359) (0.362) (0.361) (0.352) (0.318)
IMR 0.883 0.763 4.406*** 4.021*** -0.721
(0.570) (0.533) (1.066) (1.034) (1.221)




e Female 0.026 0.073 -0.573 -0.437 0.296(0.579) (0.597) (0.745) (0.706) (0.580)
IMR 4.845*** 4.876*** 8.167*** 6.428*** -0.068
(0.942) (1.047) (1.007) (1.086) (2.149)




al Female -1.485** -1.600** -1.858*** -1.498** -1.050
(0.703) (0.631) (0.647) (0.604) (0.639)
IMR 1.474* 0.922 3.216** 2.061 -1.865
(0.851) (0.754) (1.591) (1.683) (1.739)




ia Female 0.309 0.012 -0.641* -0.490 0.383(0.412) (0.396) (0.389) (0.426) (0.349)
IMR 1.889*** 2.045*** 5.985*** 5.464*** -0.368
(0.374) (0.402) (1.011) (1.011) (0.737)
R2 .064 .112 .196 .229 .578
Notes: This table shows OLS estimates for IHS-transformed net wealth of single male versus female
households (only one adult aged 25-60 present). Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01. Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
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Table 3: Net wealth gap of single households at the top of the distribution (quantile
regression)











Female -0.972** -0.107 -0.734 -1.067** -0.206
(0.384) (0.451) (0.560) (0.491) (0.354)
IMR 1.637** 1.701* 5.192** 4.222** -1.012




m Female -0.188 -0.255 -0.094 -0.011 -0.043(0.296) (0.252) (0.333) (0.377) (0.498)
IMR 0.970*** 1.020*** 4.041*** 3.948*** 2.982**





y Female -0.553 -0.342 -0.732* -0.895** -0.163
(0.549) (0.373) (0.414) (0.426) (0.365)
IMR 1.246 1.291* 3.460*** 3.339*** -0.159




Female -0.515** -0.075 -0.008 -0.089 -0.343
(0.236) (0.130) (0.179) (0.197) (0.242)
IMR 0.555 0.354 0.290 0.363 -0.524




Female -0.241* -0.332* -0.164 -0.199 -0.220
(0.136) (0.183) (0.224) (0.215) (0.157)
IMR 0.418 0.467 2.911*** 2.674*** 0.218




e Female -0.435 -0.175 -0.348 -0.626* -0.447(0.346) (0.247) (0.368) (0.343) (0.413)
IMR 1.617*** 1.906*** 2.078*** 1.343* 0.421




al Female -0.285 -0.326 -0.508* -0.446* -0.161
(0.433) (0.258) (0.262) (0.269) (0.345)
IMR -0.291 -0.169 -0.202 -0.431 -0.550




ia Female -0.302 -0.262 -0.555* -0.702** -0.006(0.275) (0.218) (0.310) (0.338) (0.225)
IMR 0.202 0.250 0.780 0.888 -0.438
(0.191) (0.234) (0.563) (0.611) (0.509)
Notes: This table shows a quantile regression at the 95th percentile of net wealth for single households
(only one adult aged 25-60 present). Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
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Figure 3: Gender gap in components of net wealth (male minus female wealth/debt)
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Notes: This graph shows the gender gap in wealth and debt categories across the unconditional distribution






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A1: Descriptive statistics for independent variables by country and household type
All Countries Austria Belgium






Aged 25-34 25.8 26.8 16.0 29.5 35.2 17.0 21.5 24.6 14.0
Aged 35-44 26.8 26.7 27.9 24.1 21.1 30.7 25.5 29.3 26.4
Aged 45-60 47.4 46.4 56.1 46.4 43.6 52.2 53.0 46.1 59.6
Education
Primary or below 14.0 14.3 11.1 0.0 0.4 0.3 4.0 7.2 4.6
Lower secondary 8.6 8.4 14.5 15.0 10.6 12.0 8.0 11.4 11.9
Upper secondary 44.2 47.6 42.5 70.6 72.2 73.1 37.0 32.9 33.2
Tertiary 33.3 29.7 31.5 14.3 16.7 14.6 51.0 48.5 50.3
Children
No children 70.5 93.7 55.4 81.9 97.8 63.5 74.5 87.4 53.6
One 17.2 3.6 21.0 10.6 1.8 17.8 11.5 7.2 19.1
Two 8.9 2.2 17.2 6.1 0.4 13.9 9.5 4.2 18.1
Three or more 3.5 0.5 6.4 1.4 0.0 4.9 4.5 1.2 9.1
Relationship status
Never married 52.2 64.8 17.8 47.8 69.8 11.4 48.5 48.5 9.8
Married 5.9 6.4 71.6 3.8 5.6 81.4 12.5 12.6 80.8
Divorced 31.8 25.9 8.6 41.3 24.2 6.1 31.0 34.7 7.5
Widowed 10.1 2.9 2.0 7.2 0.4 1.0 8.0 4.2 1.9
Employment status
Employee (permanent) 54.5 50.2 43.9 61.4 58.9 58.9 56.5 53.3 64.5
Employee (temporary) 9.3 8.2 4.4 4.2 3.6 2.1 5.5 6.6 3.3
Self-employed 6.1 11.6 10.6 4.6 8.0 10.2 1.5 5.4 5.8
Employer 2.3 5.2 6.7 1.8 3.1 5.5 2.5 3.6 2.5
Unemployed 12.3 13.6 7.6 9.6 11.0 8.5 17.7 17.8 11.2
Out of labour force 8.9 6.5 9.8 3.4 4.4 8.7 9.8 8.0 9.2
Retired 6.7 4.5 4.2 17.1 11.0 10.1 5.5 4.8 4.3
Inheritances
High inheritance 8.1 9.9 8.4 12.3 13.0 25.4 4.0 3.0 4.7
Low inheritance 18.8 20.2 14.2 13.5 12.2 14.9 19.0 16.2 26.5
No inheritance 72.1 68.6 73.3 73.8 74.9 59.5 76.5 79.6 66.6
Ownership of
Business assets 12.8 24.1 33.4 6.8 13.2 22.6 9.6 19.9 30.7
Main residence 42.8 42.8 73.8 23.9 27.3 60.5 55.0 43.1 81.0
Liabilities 43.2 42.8 61.7 35.2 34.0 48.2 48.7 41.8 66.3
Collateralized debt 19.0 19.5 38.9 7.8 9.3 30.3 30.5 28.1 51.5
Unsecured debt 29.6 28.8 42.7 28.7 25.8 24.7 24.7 21.4 32.5
Work/age ratio (%)
Mean 66.9 74.6 55.3 71.5 76.1 76.3 60.2 60.0 64.5
Median 74.1 81.2 68.4 79.2 84.4 86.5 70.6 66.7 74.3
Week work hours (#)
Mean 26.7 31.4 29.6 26.4 29.0 30.3 20.4 26.5 28.0
Median 35.0 40.0 38.0 35.0 39.8 38.5 24.0 38.0 36.0
Earnings (e)
Mean 19,048 25,615 24,545 22,934 27,832 25,642 25,233 29,283 34,261
Median 15,789 21,152 20,000 18,022 22,805 20,241 19,676 22,380 25,040










Aged 25-34 31.8 30.0 13.5 14.6 14.1 10.1 22.9 22.0 13.7
Aged 35-44 23.7 19.0 26.7 31.2 31.3 27.4 28.3 28.0 27.6
Aged 45-60 44.5 51.0 59.8 54.3 54.5 62.4 48.8 49.9 58.7
Education
Primary or below 0.8 2.0 0.7 12.6 18.2 19.1 20.4 20.2 17.1
Lower secondary 5.1 5.9 6.6 14.7 17.2 19.0 6.9 5.4 5.5
Upper secondary 60.6 53.0 52.8 26.2 22.7 22.4 37.3 46.1 43.2
Tertiary 33.5 39.1 39.9 46.5 41.9 39.5 35.4 28.2 34.2
Children
No children 75.8 97.2 61.3 71.7 94.4 54.5 64.3 91.5 46.9
One 13.1 2.4 19.0 17.0 2.0 24.9 20.1 4.7 22.4
Two 8.9 0.4 14.7 9.3 3.0 17.2 10.1 3.1 20.9
Three or more 2.1 0.0 5.0 2.0 0.5 3.4 5.5 0.8 9.7
Relationship status
Never married 46.4 66.4 9.9 47.0 60.1 11.4 60.5 65.8 18.6
Married 13.1 11.1 82.3 1.5 1.5 80.4 5.5 6.4 74.2
Divorced 34.1 19.8 6.5 39.4 34.3 5.8 25.2 24.9 6.0
Widowed 6.4 2.8 1.3 12.2 4.0 2.4 8.8 2.9 1.3
Employment status
Employee (permanent) 53.8 54.4 63.9 52.2 42.9 44.5 53.2 47.5 59.7
Employee (temporary) 12.7 3.7 5.0 13.0 9.6 8.8 8.6 7.8 3.7
Self-employed 5.9 9.1 9.1 2.1 9.2 5.0 7.6 13.9 14.3
Employer 1.7 3.2 5.2 6.4 8.5 13.1 1.8 6.0 9.5
Unemployed 14.4 15.4 8.1 12.6 19.2 11.0 13.3 13.8 5.2
Out of labour force 12.3 13.0 10.0 12.1 7.1 14.6 10.5 6.6 2.7
Retired 0.8 1.2 1.6 0.8 3.0 2.7 4.9 4.2 4.2
Inheritances
High inheritance 8.2 13.2 28.0 10.4 12.1 11.1 7.1 9.0 13.3
Low inheritance 17.6 15.7 15.2 17.2 24.8 23.0 22.3 25.3 30.3
No inheritance 74.2 71.1 56.5 72.5 62.8 65.6 69.5 64.6 55.1
Ownership of
Business assets 12.4 23.9 36.2 18.1 27.8 40.3 17.3 32.1 44.2
Main residence 17.8 20.9 63.2 66.4 66.2 85.5 40.8 45.4 71.5
Liabilities 48.5 49.2 67.9 50.7 44.5 61.8 47.0 46.3 67.5
Collateralized debt 8.9 14.8 43.8 34.5 29.4 43.9 20.5 22.0 42.0
Unsecured debt 42.5 41.1 42.9 24.7 21.7 34.7 33.6 30.6 44.3
Work/age ratio (%)
Mean 69.1 76.0 76.9 54.7 71.6 65.7 68.4 75.9 78.9
Median 76.9 83.3 84.6 55.6 73.4 72.4 76.0 81.8 85.0
Week work hours (#)
Mean 27.4 32.0 30.9 25.1 28.6 28.4
Median 32.0 40.0 38.0 35.0 40.0 38.0
Earnings (e)
Mean 19,529 29,236 29,866 16,308 20,298 17,122 18,795 20,537 27,092
Median 15,780 24,340 24,000 14,160 17,265 14,400 17,283 18,668 22,209










Aged 25-34 37.9 46.3 23.4 19.5 23.4 10.8 42.1 43.5 29.7
Aged 35-44 33.8 36.2 33.1 25.3 22.2 27.5 16.7 23.9 31.5
Aged 45-60 28.3 17.5 43.6 55.2 54.5 61.8 41.2 32.6 38.8
Education
Primary or below 9.6 2.8 13.1 40.3 41.3 51.3 0.0 0.0 0.3
Lower secondary 5.1 13.6 15.7 14.0 15.6 18.4 4.1 0.0 1.7
Upper secondary 51.0 53.1 50.1 21.7 24.6 18.1 71.9 83.3 77.2
Tertiary 34.3 30.5 21.1 24.0 18.6 12.2 24.0 16.7 20.9
Children
No children 83.3 100.0 58.8 68.8 95.8 52.9 67.9 94.2 54.8
One 10.6 0.0 20.2 17.6 3.0 27.7 24.9 4.3 26.1
Two 6.1 0.0 17.7 10.4 1.2 15.9 6.3 1.4 16.0
Three or more 0.0 0.0 3.3 3.2 0.0 3.5 0.9 0.0 3.1
Relationship status
Never married 55.1 80.8 11.4 37.1 58.7 8.4 41.2 60.1 14.2
Married 1.5 3.4 81.2 5.9 6.0 80.4 6.3 2.9 74.2
Divorced 32.8 15.3 5.1 39.4 32.3 8.2 36.2 31.2 9.6
Widowed 10.6 0.6 2.2 17.6 3.0 3.1 16.3 5.8 2.0
Employment status
Employee (permanent) 52.0 45.2 32.6 47.1 49.1 55.0 63.8 63.0 70.4
Employee (temporary) 14.1 17.5 9.5 10.9 10.8 7.5 9.5 11.6 5.6
Self-employed 9.6 15.8 16.9 5.0 9.6 8.6 6.8 12.3 6.3
Employer 2.0 6.2 4.6 2.7 3.6 6.4 1.4 3.6 3.2
Unemployed 4.0 6.8 5.5 18.1 15.0 11.4 5.4 7.2 9.5
Out of labour force 5.1 2.8 22.4 6.8 4.2 4.1 5.0 1.4 4.6
Retired 11.1 2.3 5.7 10.0 9.0 6.6 9.5 2.2 3.2
Inheritances
High inheritance 14.0 11.0 19.8 5.2 9.9 6.0 6.2 9.6 8.5
Low inheritance 10.0 11.4 10.3 8.8 11.6 15.6 27.3 23.0 23.0
No inheritance 76.0 77.3 69.0 83.3 74.9 76.2 62.4 60.1 63.2
Ownership of
Business assets 3.0 6.8 19.1 5.9 10.8 15.3 10.0 18.8 18.8
Main residence 40.4 32.8 70.4 50.7 50.3 72.2 62.9 58.0 82.0
Liabilities 36.5 40.7 49.4 41.6 36.5 56.2 21.7 28.0 38.3
Collateralized debt 9.1 6.2 23.7 29.9 26.9 42.1 6.8 9.4 16.0
Unsecured debt 29.4 36.7 34.8 19.9 17.4 27.1 15.4 20.0 26.8
Work/age ratio (%)
Mean 54.7 63.2 55.7 70.2 76.0 82.5 67.2 67.2 70.6
Median 64.1 66.7 64.9 75.9 81.1 90.6 73.5 71.4 77.4
Week work hours (#)
Mean 31.4 39.4 28.3 25.8 33.4 34.0 29.9 35.6 32.9
Median 40.0 40.0 40.0 35.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0
Earnings (e)
Mean 14,051 17,052 15,113 10,421 14,863 12,837 6,997 8,161 7,196
Median 13,333 15,264 12,540 8,144 9,980 8,950 6,028 6,888 6,247
Notes: This table shows the distribution of each characteristic within each household type, except where
noted otherwise. Male and female single households contain just one adult (aged 25-60), non-single house-
holds are all other households (reference person aged 25-60). Weekly work hours are not available for
France. Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
A3
A.2 Selection Model
Table A2: Results of selection model predicting the probability of living in a single house-
hold
Austria Belgium Germany Spain France Greece Portugal Slovakia
Female -0.320 -0.632 -0.187 -0.438 -0.689*** -0.351 -0.389 -1.041
(0.864) (0.424) (0.407) (0.494) (0.256) (0.381) (0.481) (0.857)
Age 25-34 0.203 -0.487* 0.015 -0.575** -0.477*** -0.225 -0.239 -0.648**
(0.229) (0.258) (0.176) (0.279) (0.135) (0.249) (0.361) (0.315)
Age 25-34 x Fem -0.022 0.582 -0.308 0.378 0.382** 0.298 0.276 1.059***
(0.316) (0.383) (0.244) (0.390) (0.171) (0.360) (0.378) (0.340)
Age 45-60 0.652** -0.783*** 0.310 -0.099 -0.386*** -0.050 -0.328 -0.289
(0.307) (0.218) (0.236) (0.215) (0.146) (0.260) (0.204) (0.275)
Age 45-60 x Fem -0.625* 0.883*** -0.577* -0.135 0.380** -0.513 0.229 0.731***
(0.369) (0.275) (0.338) (0.289) (0.185) (0.340) (0.262) (0.274)
Married -2.546*** -1.643*** -2.110*** -2.701*** -1.898*** -2.267*** -2.216*** -2.336***
(0.291) (0.176) (0.185) (0.279) (0.152) (0.313) (0.374) (0.237)
Married x Fem 0.293 -0.196 0.274 -0.608 0.157 -0.382 0.616 0.805**
(0.335) (0.287) (0.332) (0.520) (0.186) (0.461) (0.437) (0.321)
Widowed -0.968 0.609 0.465 0.091 0.345 1.411*** -0.474 0.229
(1.525) (0.681) (0.644) (0.571) (0.372) (0.276) (0.479) (0.383)
Widowed x Fem 1.135 -1.108 -0.544 -0.480 -0.355 -1.107*** 0.403 0.358
(1.563) (0.769) (0.702) (0.602) (0.401) (0.276) (0.524) (0.485)
Divorced -0.066 0.643** -0.178 0.441* 0.487*** 0.249 0.118 0.477*
(0.251) (0.251) (0.251) (0.241) (0.159) (0.381) (0.241) (0.280)
Divorced x Fem 0.089 -0.765** -0.062 -0.394 -0.580*** 0.132 -0.284 -0.406
(0.335) (0.321) (0.336) (0.329) (0.208) (0.383) (0.296) (0.327)
One Child -0.722 -1.377*** -1.138*** -1.904*** -1.643*** -0.467** -1.460*** -1.629***
(0.597) (0.273) (0.409) (0.649) (0.150) (0.215) (0.233) (0.391)
One Child x Fem 0.372 0.589 0.777* 1.919*** 1.437*** 1.047*** 1.289***
(0.686) (0.385) (0.439) (0.693) (0.214) (0.245) (0.457)
2+ Children -0.912 -1.533*** -1.674*** 0.006 -1.815*** 0.299 -2.049*** -1.242**
(1.211) (0.238) (0.364) (0.493) (0.138) (0.247) (0.290) (0.554)
2+ Children x
Fem 0.572 0.961*** 1.711*** 0.605 1.465*** 2.289*** 0.914
(1.250) (0.348) (0.409) (0.567) (0.214) (0.312) (0.616)
Owns Home -0.641*** -0.913*** -0.737*** -0.606*** -0.419*** -1.145*** -0.570** -0.337**
(0.213) (0.233) (0.191) (0.215) (0.098) (0.148) (0.266) (0.145)
Owns Home x
Fem 0.302 0.662** 0.204 0.522** 0.146 0.574*** 0.397 -0.456**
(0.301) (0.304) (0.248) (0.260) (0.127) (0.119) (0.297) (0.232)
Earnings 0.067 0.000 -0.016 0.011 -0.055*** 0.053** 0.057 0.002
(0.062) (0.028) (0.026) (0.041) (0.013) (0.027) (0.041) (0.078)
Earnings x Fem 0.013 -0.009 0.013 0.000 0.037** -0.008 -0.027 0.033
(0.081) (0.041) (0.037) (0.045) (0.019) (0.039) (0.044) (0.087)
Constant 0.127 1.428*** 1.175*** 0.362 1.476*** 0.217 0.180 0.740
(0.665) (0.320) (0.339) (0.420) (0.211) (0.322) (0.404) (0.809)
Observations 1,500 1,387 2,044 3,102 8,648 1,807 2,409 1,625
Notes: This table shows the results of the model predicting selection into a single household (only one
adult present) for the population aged 25-60. The variables “two” and “three or more children present”
are combined for this estimation due to a low number of observations in the latter. Standard errors in
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
A4
A.3 OLS Model
Table A3: Net wealth of single households at the mean - Austria
Base Age &Education Family Inheritance
Labor &
Assets
Female 0.672 0.899 -0.200 -0.047 0.630
(0.586) (0.572) (0.706) (0.690) (0.722)
IMR 1.806*** 1.850*** 9.856*** 7.912*** 3.677
(0.488) (0.548) (2.775) (3.010) (3.066)
Aged 25-34 -0.008 0.501 0.569 0.479
(0.810) (0.858) (0.835) (0.723)
Aged 45-60 1.152 1.750** 1.364* 0.278
(0.736) (0.771) (0.723) (0.581)
Primary or below 5.164*** 6.658*** 7.286*** 4.924*
(1.579) (1.808) (1.842) (2.654)
Upper secondary 4.225*** 4.283*** 4.082*** 3.362***
(0.904) (0.956) (0.972) (0.924)
Tertiary 5.886*** 6.049*** 5.547*** 4.430***
(1.167) (1.215) (1.267) (1.121)
One child -1.430 -0.927 -0.492
(1.036) (1.100) (0.930)
Two children -2.419 -1.959 -1.500
(2.715) (2.590) (2.168)
Three+ children -4.960 -4.424 0.430
(7.143) (7.115) (7.542)
Never married 15.726*** 12.683** 5.001
(5.125) (5.413) (5.525)
Divorced 15.172*** 12.381** 5.274
(5.135) (5.470) (5.432)
Widowed 18.207*** 15.021*** 8.138
(5.402) (5.716) (5.857)
Large inheritance 3.066*** 2.156***
(0.578) (0.752)


























Constant 7.646*** 2.981*** -15.476** -11.987* -1.958
(0.611) (1.132) (6.102) (6.425) (6.754)
R2 .022 .094 .145 .173 .387
Notes: This table shows OLS estimates of net wealth for single households (only one adult aged 25-60 present).
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
A5
Table A4: Net wealth of single households at the mean - Belgium
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Age &Education Family Inheritance
Labor &
Assets
Female 0.099 0.097 -0.122 -0.146 0.023
(0.490) (0.419) (0.433) (0.436) (0.422)
IMR 1.516** 1.051 5.952*** 5.766*** -0.328
(0.677) (0.667) (1.026) (1.012) (1.170)
Aged 25-34 -2.396*** -2.818*** -2.808*** -1.240*
(0.663) (0.615) (0.628) (0.688)
Aged 45-60 0.976*** -0.114 -0.207 0.877
(0.337) (0.446) (0.475) (0.619)
Primary or below -1.925 -2.124 -2.157 -1.416
(1.290) (1.421) (1.464) (1.428)
Upper secondary 0.541 0.375 0.350 -1.239
(0.870) (0.929) (0.955) (1.086)
Tertiary 2.068** 1.582* 1.510* -0.010
(0.825) (0.845) (0.883) (0.941)
One child -3.424*** -3.322*** -0.075
(1.074) (1.056) (1.134)
Two children -2.532*** -2.380*** 1.551
(0.705) (0.723) (0.967)
Three+ children -3.682 -3.463 -0.359
(2.929) (2.948) (2.145)
Never married 7.270*** 7.115*** 0.277
(1.422) (1.455) (1.635)
Divorced 7.408*** 7.262*** -0.702
(1.539) (1.567) (1.810)
Widowed 7.069*** 6.974*** -0.500
(1.344) (1.368) (1.764)
Large inheritance 1.500** 0.032
(0.679) (0.840)



























Constant 9.359*** 8.821*** 0.754 0.947 8.844***
(0.438) (0.932) (1.928) (1.925) (2.154)
R2 .029 .184 .251 .256 .428
Notes: This table shows OLS estimates of net wealth for single households (only one adult aged 25-60 present).
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
A6
Table A5: Net wealth of single households at the mean - Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Age &Education Family Inheritance
Labor &
Assets
Female -0.884 -0.602 -1.059 -0.909 -0.239
(0.904) (0.872) (0.825) (0.886) (0.913)
IMR 0.831 0.783 11.253*** 9.296*** 5.983***
(1.082) (1.004) (1.869) (1.838) (2.186)
Aged 25-34 -0.474 -1.807 -1.598 -0.752
(1.192) (1.145) (1.187) (1.175)
Aged 45-60 0.873 1.016 0.507 -0.128
(1.074) (1.064) (1.075) (1.080)
Primary or below -0.602 -0.626 -0.979 -1.195
(4.777) (4.794) (4.838) (4.162)
Upper secondary 4.036 2.733 2.294 1.601
(2.585) (2.361) (2.401) (1.723)
Tertiary 7.355*** 5.549** 4.719** 3.060*
(2.594) (2.357) (2.327) (1.628)
One child -3.020** -2.195 -0.066
(1.475) (1.534) (1.806)
Two children -4.138 -4.590* -3.010
(2.716) (2.548) (2.443)
Three+ children 4.721*** 3.585** 3.988**
(1.495) (1.697) (1.585)
Never married 17.068*** 14.597*** 11.465***
(3.082) (2.986) (3.406)
Divorced 12.677*** 10.910*** 8.399***
(2.866) (2.696) (3.069)
Widowed 14.631*** 12.458*** 7.876**
(2.793) (2.741) (3.615)
Large inheritance 4.193*** 1.858**
(0.778) (0.928)



























Constant 7.128*** 2.021 -15.372*** -12.456*** -6.168
(0.733) (2.631) (3.892) (3.839) (4.662)
R2 .005 .093 .251 .256 .428
Notes: This table shows OLS estimates of net wealth for single households (only one adult aged 25-60 present).
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
A7
Table A6: Net wealth of single households at the mean - Spain
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Age &Education Family Inheritance
Labor &
Assets
Female -0.395 -0.651 -1.520** -1.213* -0.272
(0.642) (0.615) (0.679) (0.652) (0.591)
IMR 1.991* 2.101* 6.150*** 5.147*** -2.592
(1.032) (1.144) (1.795) (1.649) (1.916)
Aged 25-34 -2.347** -3.332*** -3.136*** 0.468
(1.135) (1.106) (1.101) (1.035)
Aged 45-60 0.726 0.472 0.238 0.288
(0.657) (0.857) (0.874) (0.731)
Primary or below -0.468 -0.507 -0.627 -0.768
(1.133) (1.045) (1.022) (0.862)
Upper secondary 0.503 0.518 0.464 0.418
(1.387) (1.149) (1.096) (0.915)
Tertiary 2.636** 3.142*** 2.912*** 2.406**
(1.070) (0.991) (1.020) (1.033)
One child 0.358 0.367 1.753*
(1.401) (1.357) (0.976)
Two children 4.468*** 4.319*** 1.342
(1.499) (1.411) (1.097)
Three+ children -1.217 -1.575 -0.760
(5.374) (5.543) (4.273)
Never married 15.408*** 13.157*** -5.324
(4.231) (3.747) (4.366)
Divorced 15.363*** 13.078*** -6.326
(4.623) (4.137) (4.756)
Widowed 15.839*** 13.761*** -4.403
(3.960) (3.529) (4.178)
Large inheritance 2.651*** 0.789
(0.623) (0.869)



























Constant 9.056*** 8.119*** -10.471* -7.890 12.035**
(1.003) (1.445) (5.698) (5.136) (5.786)
R2 .014 .111 .186 .214 .473
Notes: This table shows OLS estimates of net wealth for single households (only one adult aged 25-60 present).
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
A8
Table A7: Net wealth of single households at the mean - France
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Age &Education Family Inheritance
Labor &
Assets
Female -0.128 -0.343 0.212 0.199 -0.063
(0.359) (0.362) (0.361) (0.352) (0.318)
IMR 0.883 0.763 4.406*** 4.021*** -0.721
(0.570) (0.533) (1.066) (1.034) (1.221)
Aged 25-34 -0.810* -1.348*** -1.124** -0.089
(0.449) (0.469) (0.459) (0.476)
Aged 45-60 1.702*** 0.616 0.456 0.521
(0.414) (0.450) (0.457) (0.432)
Primary or below -1.385* -1.191 -0.986 -0.798
(0.770) (0.830) (0.800) (0.700)
Upper secondary 0.070 -0.007 0.058 -0.020
(0.652) (0.692) (0.677) (0.536)
Tertiary 1.676** 1.341 1.305 0.725
(0.776) (0.846) (0.816) (0.625)
One child -1.963*** -1.640** 0.249
(0.680) (0.667) (0.665)
Two children -3.443*** -3.021*** -0.665
(0.874) (0.878) (0.881)
Three+ children -4.232*** -3.945*** -1.258
(1.342) (1.337) (1.228)
Never married 5.294*** 4.927*** -1.611
(1.617) (1.581) (1.714)
Divorced 5.896*** 5.516*** -1.225
(1.661) (1.644) (1.670)
Widowed 6.034*** 5.694*** -1.795
(1.761) (1.768) (1.856)
Large inheritance 3.177*** 1.258***
(0.306) (0.238)



























Constant 9.163*** 8.590*** 2.077 2.073 10.979***
(0.338) (0.812) (2.045) (1.996) (2.332)
R2 .005 .074 .110 .136 .329
Notes: This table shows OLS estimates of net wealth for single households (only one adult aged 25-60 present).
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
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Table A8: Net wealth of single households at the mean - Greece
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Age &Education Family Inheritance
Labor &
Assets
Female 0.026 0.073 -0.573 -0.437 0.296
(0.579) (0.597) (0.745) (0.706) (0.580)
IMR 4.845*** 4.876*** 8.167*** 6.428*** -0.068
(0.942) (1.047) (1.007) (1.086) (2.149)
Aged 25-34 0.260 0.155 0.386 0.887
(0.554) (0.555) (0.559) (0.630)
Aged 45-60 1.000 -0.417 0.165 0.729
(1.063) (1.141) (1.221) (1.206)
Primary or below -1.837 -1.659 -1.905 -0.650
(1.943) (1.906) (1.857) (1.564)
Upper secondary 0.049 0.391 0.192 1.366
(1.143) (1.033) (1.055) (1.046)
Tertiary 1.142 1.532 1.365 2.566*
(1.087) (1.144) (1.176) (1.310)
One child -2.356 -1.646 -0.619
(1.919) (1.988) (2.138)
Two children 2.694 2.632 -0.507
(2.257) (2.261) (2.361)
Three+ children 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.)
Never married 13.116*** 10.014*** -0.969
(1.895) (2.119) (3.939)
Divorced 13.054*** 9.701*** -1.757
(2.506) (2.807) (4.633)
Widowed 15.162*** 11.978*** 0.396
(2.588) (2.818) (4.647)
Large inheritance 1.801*** -0.078
(0.545) (0.576)



























Constant 5.218*** 4.566*** -10.526*** -6.725** 6.182
(0.882) (1.402) (2.813) (2.952) (5.225)
R2 .112 .132 .210 .224 .370
Notes: This table shows OLS estimates of net wealth for single households (only one adult aged 25-60 present).
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
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Table A9: Net wealth of single households at the mean - Portugal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Age &Education Family Inheritance
Labor &
Assets
Female -1.485** -1.600** -1.858*** -1.498** -1.050
(0.703) (0.631) (0.647) (0.604) (0.639)
IMR 1.474* 0.922 3.216** 2.061 -1.865
(0.851) (0.754) (1.591) (1.683) (1.739)
Aged 25-34 -1.926 -2.323* -2.198* 0.026
(1.270) (1.255) (1.218) (0.984)
Aged 45-60 1.982*** 1.247 1.249 1.917***
(0.647) (0.808) (0.775) (0.571)
Primary or below -2.357** -2.588** -2.505** -1.697**
(1.037) (1.077) (1.085) (0.741)
Upper secondary 2.788** 2.937** 3.099** 3.549***
(1.226) (1.217) (1.220) (0.920)
Tertiary 2.604** 2.588* 2.570** 3.236***
(1.290) (1.331) (1.285) (0.851)
One child -0.554 -0.087 2.588**
(1.146) (1.184) (1.112)
Two children -2.046 -2.271 -0.449
(1.679) (1.684) (1.745)
Three+ children 2.983** 3.109** 5.431***
(1.421) (1.377) (1.508)
Never married 4.339* 2.479 -3.641
(2.618) (2.860) (2.986)
Divorced 3.666 2.173 -3.641
(2.761) (2.902) (2.901)
Widowed 5.163* 3.576 -3.035
(2.874) (2.916) (2.783)
Large inheritance 3.171*** 1.313**
(0.668) (0.648)



























Constant 8.390*** 8.190*** 2.966 4.759 8.589*
(1.033) (1.268) (4.218) (4.415) (4.602)
R2 .027 .180 .209 .242 .506
Notes: This table shows OLS estimates of net wealth for single households (only one adult aged 25-60 present).
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
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Table A10: Net wealth of single households at the mean - Slovakia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Age &Education Family Inheritance
Labor &
Assets
Female 0.309 0.012 -0.641* -0.490 0.383
(0.412) (0.396) (0.389) (0.426) (0.349)
IMR 1.889*** 2.045*** 5.985*** 5.464*** -0.368
(0.374) (0.402) (1.011) (1.011) (0.737)
Aged 25-34 -0.572 -0.514 -0.324 0.634
(0.850) (0.891) (0.869) (0.622)
Aged 45-60 0.934 0.771 0.788 -0.009
(0.847) (0.842) (0.822) (0.561)
Primary or below 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Upper secondary 0.166 0.230 -0.005 0.609
(0.692) (0.595) (0.642) (0.500)
Tertiary 1.497** 1.431** 1.046 1.038**
(0.738) (0.722) (0.748) (0.527)
One child -3.238*** -2.871*** -0.691
(0.558) (0.577) (0.498)
Two children -2.737** -2.257* 0.136
(1.102) (1.192) (0.961)
Three+ children -4.799** -4.844** 4.512
(1.757) (1.792) (2.780)
Never married 7.148*** 6.488*** -2.187*
(1.409) (1.464) (1.317)
Divorced 8.176*** 7.625*** -1.919
(1.627) (1.711) (1.479)
Widowed 8.975*** 8.311*** -1.839
(1.731) (1.797) (1.608)
Large inheritance 2.003*** 0.850*
(0.397) (0.438)



























Constant 8.289*** 7.642*** -2.422 -1.897 7.830***
(0.569) (1.185) (2.882) (2.912) (2.315)
R2 .064 .112 .196 .229 .578
Notes: This table shows OLS estimates of net wealth for single households (only one adult aged 25-60 present).
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
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A.4 Net Wealth
Tables A11 to A18 show the detailed results of a quantile regression at the 95th per-
centile of the net wealth distribution for each of the eight countries studied. Conditional
on statistical significance, the control variables in models (2)-(5) show the expected effects
found in the literature. Younger single households have lower and older single households
have higher wealth.16 Wealth decreases with primary education, and it increases with
higher secondary and tertiary education relative to lower secondary education. The pa-
rameters are mostly economically significant — having completed tertiary education goes
along with net wealth between less than 50% (Spain, model 4) and 180% (Austria, model
3) higher compared to single households in which the adult completed just lower secondary
education.
Family characteristics are strongly linked to net wealth at the top of the distribution,
and the size of coefficients is economically significant; only in Spain are neither children
present nor marital status statistically significant. Single households in which there are
children present have lower net wealth; effects range from roughly 70% lower wealth (one
child in France, model 4) to almost 6 times lower wealth (three or more children in Slo-
vakia, model 3). Regarding marital status, never having been married, being divorced
and widowed are positively correlated to net wealth with the exception of Slovakia in
model (5): vis-à-vis the married reference group, it is around 2.7 times higher for divorced
single households in Germany (model 3) and about 6.8 times higher for widowed single
households in Austria (model 3).
Having received a large inheritance is statistically significant in all countries except
Portugal, and they remain statistically significant in the full model (5) in all countries
except Belgium and Slovakia. The size of the effect is, again, economically significant, but
varies across countries. Having received a large inheritances goes along more than 50%
higher wealth in Slovakia, up to 360% higher wealth in Belgium. Small inheritances are
not statistically significant at the top of the distribution.
Of labour market characteristics and assets, only home ownership is fairly consistently
associated with net wealth at the top of the distribution; the only exceptions are Spain
and Greece. The other variables are statistically significant more sporadically across coun-
tries. Owning business assets indicates higher wealth in Austria, Germany, and in France.
Unsecured debt (Austria) signals lower wealth, while collateralized debt (i.e., mortgages)
are not statistically significant in any country. Of the variable capturing employment
outcomes, temporary contracts (Germany, France), unemployment, and retirement (both
France) indicate lower net wealth, whereas employing others (France, Portugal) and his-
torical labour market attachment (work/age ratio, Germany)17 go along with higher net
wealth.
16The only exception is age 45-60 in Greece in model (3).
17In Spain, the work/age ratio is negatively correlated with higher wealth.
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Table A11: Net wealth of single households at the top of the distribution - Austria
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Age,Education Family Inheritance
Labor &
Assets
Female -0.972** -0.107 -0.734 -1.067** -0.206
(0.384) (0.451) (0.560) (0.491) (0.354)
IMR 1.637** 1.701* 5.192** 4.222** -1.012
(0.689) (0.887) (2.276) (1.642) (1.459)
Aged 25-34 -0.471 -0.296 -0.313 -0.792**
(0.490) (0.471) (0.503) (0.351)
Aged 45-60 1.210** 1.461*** 1.032** 0.066
(0.489) (0.488) (0.453) (0.450)
Primary or below -2.952 -2.711 -2.436 -2.112
(2.215) (2.567) (1.858) (2.346)
Upper secondary 0.782 1.030 1.184** 1.005*
(0.556) (0.755) (0.547) (0.529)
Tertiary 1.490** 1.802** 1.799** 1.322**
(0.659) (0.747) (0.724) (0.590)
One child -0.874 -0.253 1.028
(0.996) (1.101) (1.055)
Two children -1.022 -0.098 0.867
(1.018) (0.855) (0.730)
Three+ children -1.546 -0.734 0.816
(6.155) (6.249) (6.241)
Never married 5.965 4.299 -3.703
(3.661) (3.082) (2.745)
Divorced 6.470* 4.520 -3.671
(3.704) (3.025) (2.780)
Widowed 6.804* 5.357* -3.107
(3.545) (3.139) (3.132)
Large inheritance 1.672*** 1.626***
(0.510) (0.525)



























Constant 13.432*** 11.413*** 3.775 5.554 14.287***
(0.443) (0.939) (4.280) (3.765) (3.112)
Notes: This table shows a quantile regression at the 95th percentile of net wealth for single households
(only one adult aged 25-60 present). Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
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Table A12: Net wealth of single households at the top of the distribution - Belgium
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Age,Education Family Inheritance
Labor &
Assets
Female -0.188 -0.255 -0.094 -0.011 -0.043
(0.296) (0.252) (0.333) (0.377) (0.498)
IMR 0.970*** 1.020*** 4.041*** 3.948*** 2.982**
(0.265) (0.254) (0.948) (0.908) (1.231)
Aged 25-34 -1.134** -0.825 -0.866 -0.311
(0.523) (0.606) (0.670) (0.616)
Aged 45-60 0.674*** -0.054 -0.107 0.029
(0.227) (0.343) (0.333) (0.604)
Primary or below -1.576* -0.904 -0.857 -0.691
(0.830) (0.999) (1.144) (1.049)
Upper secondary 0.073 0.491 0.463 0.179
(0.546) (0.717) (0.940) (0.739)
Tertiary 0.624 1.325 1.279 1.048
(0.509) (0.762) (1.031) (0.755)
One child -2.157** -2.178** -1.377
(0.890) (0.885) (0.931)
Two children -1.965** -2.042** -0.035
(0.971) (0.967) (1.121)
Three+ children -1.699** -1.606* -0.986
(0.712) (0.859) (0.782)
Never married 4.003** 4.016** 3.404**
(1.601) (1.484) (1.620)
Divorced 4.514** 4.553*** 3.662*
(1.649) (1.465) (1.815)
Widowed 4.898*** 4.931*** 3.722**
(1.508) (1.446) (1.524)
Large inheritance 3.565** 0.745
(1.556) (1.154)



























Constant 13.236*** 12.628*** 6.697*** 6.724*** 5.559**
(0.251) (0.573) (2.330) (2.312) (2.338)
Notes: This table shows a quantile regression at the 95th percentile of net wealth for single households
(only one adult aged 25-60 present). Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
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Table A13: Net wealth of single households at the top of the distribution - Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Age,Education Family Inheritance
Labor &
Assets
Female -0.553 -0.342 -0.732* -0.895** -0.163
(0.548) (0.373) (0.414) (0.426) (0.365)
IMR 1.246 1.291* 3.460*** 3.339*** -0.159
(0.966) (0.668) (0.834) (0.903) (1.434)
Aged 25-34 -0.320 -0.662* -0.674* -0.076
(0.375) (0.387) (0.395) (0.497)
Aged 45-60 0.553* 0.627* 0.392 0.489
(0.329) (0.342) (0.342) (0.415)
Primary or below -3.816 -2.762 -2.874 -2.698
(2.884) (3.146) (3.242) (3.053)
Upper secondary 0.191 0.484 0.162 -0.047
(0.822) (0.735) (0.691) (0.726)
Tertiary 1.589* 1.653** 0.946 1.085
(0.855) (0.808) (0.689) (0.741)
One child -0.716 -1.217** 0.678
(0.772) (0.569) (0.579)
Two children -0.877 -0.824 -0.447
(0.774) (0.655) (0.686)
Three+ children -1.766*** -1.754** 0.004
(0.667) (0.713) (0.901)
Never married 3.470*** 3.432*** -0.283
(0.977) (1.145) (1.722)
Divorced 2.694*** 2.863*** -0.456
(0.886) (1.037) (1.597)
Widowed 3.910*** 3.224*** -0.651
(1.136) (1.169) (1.833)
Large inheritance 2.039*** 0.903**
(0.510) (0.440)



























Constant 12.872*** 11.678*** 7.330*** 7.680*** 10.136***
(0.450) (0.927) (1.428) (1.438) (2.474)
Notes: This table shows a quantile regression at the 95th percentile of net wealth for single households
(only one adult aged 25-60 present). Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
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Table A14: Net wealth of single households at the top of the distribution - Spain
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Age,Education Family Inheritance
Labor &
Assets
Female -0.515** -0.075 -0.008 -0.089 -0.343
(0.236) (0.130) (0.179) (0.197) (0.242)
IMR 0.555 0.354 0.290 0.363 -0.524
(0.489) (0.603) (0.700) (0.636) (0.767)
Aged 25-34 -0.503 -0.502 -0.744** -0.140
(0.320) (0.412) (0.345) (0.356)
Aged 45-60 0.238 0.240 0.330 0.620**
(0.219) (0.215) (0.207) (0.314)
Primary or below -0.258 -0.157 -0.251 -0.208
(0.238) (0.260) (0.258) (0.287)
Upper secondary 0.264 0.162 0.222 -0.014
(0.255) (0.245) (0.197) (0.291)
Tertiary 0.763*** 0.789*** 0.457** 0.400
(0.233) (0.229) (0.228) (0.354)
One child 0.052 -0.136 -0.138
(0.242) (0.276) (0.328)
Two children 0.173 0.456 -0.192
(0.451) (0.466) (0.388)
Three+ children -0.671 -0.333 -0.916
(3.216) (3.215) (3.176)
Never married 1.716 1.868 -0.626
(2.377) (2.069) (2.433)
Divorced 1.689 1.881 -0.327
(2.476) (2.201) (2.491)
Widowed 1.841 1.838 -0.283
(2.305) (1.995) (2.349)
Large inheritance 0.710** 0.798**
(0.276) (0.376)



























Constant 13.692*** 13.062*** 11.285*** 11.037*** 14.428***
(0.370) (0.499) (2.867) (2.550) (3.039)
Notes: This table shows a quantile regression at the 95th percentile of net wealth for single households
(only one adult aged 25-60 present). Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
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Table A15: Net wealth of single households at the top of the distribution - France
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Age,Education Family Inheritance
Labor &
Assets
Female -0.241* -0.332* -0.164 -0.199 -0.220
(0.136) (0.183) (0.224) (0.215) (0.157)
IMR 0.418 0.467 2.911*** 2.674*** 0.218
(0.319) (0.306) (0.690) (0.642) (0.346)
Aged 25-34 -0.797*** -1.116*** -0.787*** -0.002
(0.207) (0.245) (0.224) (0.272)
Aged 45-60 0.647*** 0.148 0.295 0.582***
(0.172) (0.228) (0.195) (0.171)
Primary or below -0.333* -0.450 -0.276 -0.215
(0.195) (0.303) (0.345) (0.294)
Upper secondary 0.353* 0.267 0.296 0.069
(0.194) (0.281) (0.276) (0.286)
Tertiary 0.631*** 0.635** 0.592* 0.798***
(0.208) (0.274) (0.310) (0.303)
One child -0.927*** -0.725*** -0.074
(0.215) (0.252) (0.234)
Two children -1.104*** -0.822** 0.389
(0.298) (0.325) (0.407)
Three+ children -2.093*** -1.859*** -0.485
(0.553) (0.567) (0.364)
Never married 3.210*** 2.804*** -0.185
(0.852) (0.839) (0.528)
Divorced 3.772*** 3.423*** -0.095
(0.893) (0.886) (0.576)
Widowed 3.947*** 3.498*** 0.608
(1.021) (0.911) (0.610)
Large inheritance 1.449*** 1.544***
(0.435) (0.453)

























Constant 13.610*** 13.059*** 8.628*** 8.589*** 11.370***
(0.205) (0.321) (1.171) (1.221) (0.806)
Notes: This table shows a quantile regression at the 95th percentile of net wealth for single households
(only one adult aged 25-60 present). Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
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Table A16: Net wealth of single households at the top of the distribution - Greece
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Age,Education Family Inheritance
Labor &
Assets
Female -0.435 -0.175 -0.348 -0.626* -0.447
(0.346) (0.247) (0.368) (0.343) (0.413)
IMR 1.617*** 1.906*** 2.078*** 1.343* 0.421
(0.460) (0.451) (0.590) (0.717) (1.205)
Aged 25-34 -0.549 -0.597 -0.450 -0.334
(0.378) (0.424) (0.346) (0.537)
Aged 45-60 -0.386 -0.765* -0.522 -0.175
(0.388) (0.447) (0.413) (0.431)
Primary or below -1.113* -1.090 -0.843 -0.229
(0.605) (0.716) (0.640) (0.830)
Upper secondary -0.558 -0.501 -0.119 0.022
(0.664) (0.671) (0.472) (0.516)
Tertiary -0.509 -0.369 -0.110 0.119
(0.724) (0.778) (0.639) (0.720)
One child -1.580** -0.912 -0.023
(0.766) (0.761) (0.941)
Two children -0.042 0.110 0.610
(0.653) (0.598) (0.875)
Never married 5.221*** 3.392** 1.075
(1.306) (1.600) (2.649)
Divorced 5.736*** 4.068** 1.135
(1.496) (1.727) (2.883)
Widowed 5.621*** 3.965*** 0.957
(1.225) (1.442) (2.971)
Large inheritance 0.762** 1.031**
(0.371) (0.438)



























Constant 12.034*** 12.518*** 7.224*** 8.857*** 10.827***
(0.442) (0.759) (1.854) (2.110) (3.705)
Notes: This table shows a quantile regression at the 95th percentile of net wealth for single households
(only one adult aged 25-60 present). Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
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Table A17: Net wealth of single households at the top of the distribution - Portugal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Age,Education Family Inheritance
Labor &
Assets
Female -0.285 -0.326 -0.508* -0.446* -0.161
(0.433) (0.258) (0.262) (0.269) (0.345)
IMR -0.291 -0.169 -0.202 -0.431 -0.550
(0.266) (0.391) (1.102) (1.175) (0.832)
Aged 25-34 -1.401*** -1.316*** -1.147*** 0.156
(0.448) (0.383) (0.434) (0.469)
Aged 45-60 0.303 0.514 0.704 1.088**
(0.335) (0.390) (0.481) (0.482)
Primary or below -0.809** -0.898** -0.960** -0.715*
(0.356) (0.357) (0.389) (0.405)
Upper secondary 0.832* 1.149*** 1.163** 0.855*
(0.458) (0.387) (0.476) (0.449)
Tertiary 0.904*** 1.261*** 1.235*** 1.098***
(0.349) (0.377) (0.476) (0.413)
One child 0.095 0.090 0.500
(0.552) (0.611) (0.613)
Two children -1.138** -1.177** -0.514
(0.524) (0.560) (0.762)
Three+ children 0.372 0.264 0.000
(1.179) (1.280) (1.291)
Never married -0.208 -0.669 -0.849
(1.536) (1.711) (1.440)
Divorced 0.139 -0.320 -0.802
(1.382) (1.590) (1.456)
Widowed 0.352 -0.111 -0.768
(1.535) (1.732) (1.502)
Large inheritance 0.198 0.403
(0.324) (0.458)



























Constant 13.668*** 13.627*** 13.448*** 13.908*** 12.250***
(0.462) (0.577) (2.346) (2.557) (1.787)
Notes: This table shows a quantile regression at the 95th percentile of net wealth for single households
(only one adult aged 25-60 present). Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
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Table A18: Net wealth of single households at the top of the distribution - Slovakia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Age,Education Family Inheritance
Labor &
Assets
Female -0.302 -0.262 -0.555* -0.702** -0.006
(0.275) (0.218) (0.310) (0.338) (0.225)
IMR 0.202 0.250 0.780 0.888 -0.438
(0.191) (0.235) (0.563) (0.611) (0.509)
Aged 25-34 -0.185 0.034 -0.042 0.128
(0.306) (0.400) (0.389) (0.346)
Aged 45-60 0.404 0.508 0.437 0.067
(0.313) (0.372) (0.355) (0.302)
Upper secondary 0.048 -0.180 -0.217 0.283
(0.355) (0.427) (0.502) (0.544)
Tertiary 0.692 0.213 0.237 0.935*
(0.421) (0.505) (0.572) (0.560)
One child -0.426 -0.288 0.426
(0.370) (0.389) (0.416)
Two children -0.533 -0.306 0.241
(0.331) (0.395) (0.538)
Three+ children -5.916*** -5.843*** -3.319**
(1.008) (0.961) (1.331)
Never married 0.755 0.673 -2.132**
(0.472) (0.792) (0.949)
Divorced 1.156 1.029 -1.806*
(0.867) (0.936) (0.997)
Widowed 1.076 1.185 -1.990*
(0.911) (0.979) (1.020)
Large inheritance 0.549* 0.479
(0.291) (0.362)



























Constant 12.548*** 12.047*** 11.049*** 11.026*** 12.047***
(0.262) (0.583) (1.332) (1.353) (1.310)
Notes: This table shows a quantile regression at the 95th percentile of net wealth for single households
(only one adult aged 25-60 present). Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
A21
A.5 Gross Wealth
Table A19: Gross wealth of single households at the top of the distribution











Female -0.707*** -0.339 -0.393 -0.785** -0.438*
(0.211) (0.250) (0.298) (0.337) (0.261)
IMR 0.372** 0.475** 1.894** 1.616 -0.426




m Female -0.316 -0.247 -0.296 -0.158 -0.154(0.226) (0.168) (0.189) (0.187) (0.241)
IMR 0.310** 0.421*** 0.475* 0.634*** -0.137





y Female -0.455 -0.126 -0.340 -0.327 -0.445*
(0.385) (0.304) (0.249) (0.259) (0.258)
IMR 0.439*** 0.442*** 1.153*** 0.783** -0.445**




Female -0.529*** -0.500* -0.347 -0.335* -0.239
(0.177) (0.235) (0.214) (0.182) (0.161)
IMR 0.066 0.056 0.042 0.072 0.061




Female -0.378*** -0.401*** -0.443*** -0.462*** -0.326***
(0.122) (0.110) (0.097) (0.118) (0.108)
IMR 0.187*** 0.162*** 0.359*** 0.354*** -0.016




e Female -0.588*** -0.605*** -0.523*** -0.613*** -0.478**(0.142) (0.121) (0.145) (0.161) (0.194)
IMR 0.122** 0.020 0.362** 0.332** -0.021




al Female -0.449 -0.637*** -0.738*** -0.716*** -0.204
(0.358) (0.171) (0.187) (0.195) (0.224)
IMR 0.133*** 0.096** 0.167 0.201* -0.092




ia Female -0.640*** -0.519*** -0.596*** -0.504*** -0.265*(0.141) (0.174) (0.151) (0.124) (0.144)
IMR 0.020 0.073 -0.062 -0.016 -0.144
(0.070) (0.091) (0.204) (0.213) (0.113)
Notes: This table shows a quantile regression at the 95th percentile of gross wealth for single households
(only one adult aged 25-60 present). Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
A22
A.6 Real Wealth
Table A20: Real wealth of single households at the top of the distribution











Female -0.703*** -0.449 -0.460 -0.932*** -0.641*
(0.239) (0.285) (0.281) (0.354) (0.316)
IMR 0.372** 0.406* 1.914** 1.673 -0.134




m Female -0.120 -0.037 -0.190 -0.239* -0.198(0.288) (0.165) (0.149) (0.141) (0.188)
IMR 0.311*** 0.371*** 0.345* 0.319* -0.288*





y Female -0.296 -0.209 -0.334 -0.348 -0.199
(0.273) (0.265) (0.229) (0.229) (0.354)
IMR 0.328*** 0.286*** 0.530* 0.489* -0.426*




Female -0.546*** -0.429* -0.364* -0.372** -0.243
(0.178) (0.207) (0.201) (0.176) (0.168)
IMR 0.049 0.039 0.046 0.065 0.062




Female -0.407*** -0.335*** -0.382*** -0.463*** -0.289**
(0.136) (0.109) (0.105) (0.133) (0.115)
IMR 0.183*** 0.178*** 0.351*** 0.347*** -0.058




e Female -0.577*** -0.599*** -0.511*** -0.558*** -0.411**(0.158) (0.107) (0.147) (0.160) (0.198)
IMR 0.098* 0.010 0.271* 0.206 0.029




al Female -0.266 -0.625*** -0.609*** -0.616*** -0.020
(0.486) (0.187) (0.227) (0.225) (0.336)
IMR 0.109** 0.078* 0.104 0.150 -0.005




ia Female -0.677*** -0.593*** -0.637*** -0.550*** -0.324*(0.169) (0.157) (0.172) (0.137) (0.180)
IMR 0.018 0.063 -0.110 -0.049 -0.130
(0.074) (0.086) (0.189) (0.206) (0.135)
Notes: This table shows a quantile regression at the 95th percentile of real wealth for single households
(only one adult aged 25-60 present). Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
A23
A.7 Financial Wealth
Table A21: Financial wealth of single households at the top of the distribution











Female -0.789*** -0.429** -0.508** -0.607** -0.498**
(0.288) (0.217) (0.242) (0.241) (0.239)
IMR 0.154 0.243** 0.368 0.247 -0.515




m Female -0.344 -0.456 -0.335 -0.421 -0.438(0.389) (0.309) (0.309) (0.269) (0.273)
IMR 0.379** 0.519*** 0.806** 0.921*** 0.248





y Female -0.802*** -0.483** -0.693*** -0.734*** -0.470**
(0.198) (0.180) (0.208) (0.197) (0.237)
IMR 0.177* 0.136* 0.589*** 0.354*** -0.335*




Female -0.581 -0.941*** -0.575* -0.443 -0.400
(0.404) (0.276) (0.312) (0.332) (0.422)
IMR 0.007 0.042 -0.388* -0.266 -0.535**




Female -0.189* -0.508*** -0.433*** -0.427*** -0.315**
(0.114) (0.120) (0.149) (0.160) (0.148)
IMR 0.198*** 0.086* 0.289** 0.269** 0.055




e Female -1.332*** -1.427*** -1.431*** -1.363*** -1.016***(0.342) (0.333) (0.362) (0.363) (0.358)
IMR 0.091 0.002 -0.106 -0.181 -0.305




al Female -0.516* -0.760** -0.714** -0.728** -0.391
(0.275) (0.305) (0.331) (0.332) (0.310)
IMR 0.092 0.036 0.067 0.078 -0.020




ia Female -0.120 -0.147 -0.092 -0.079 -0.178(0.329) (0.382) (0.456) (0.472) (0.419)
IMR 0.031 0.066 0.035 0.061 -0.323
(0.101) (0.112) (0.193) (0.209) (0.269)
Notes: This table shows a quantile regression at the 95th percentile of financial wealth for single households
(only one adult aged 25-60 present). Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
A24
A.8 Debt
Table A22: Debt of single households at the top of the distribution











Female -0.120 -0.306 -0.279 -0.309 -0.494
(0.233) (0.341) (0.365) (0.409) (0.329)
IMR 0.479*** 0.441** 1.008** 1.045** 0.062




m Female 0.088 -0.004 -0.092 -0.088 -0.084(0.355) (0.386) (0.298) (0.292) (0.335)
IMR 0.152** 0.137 0.539** 0.557** 0.144





y Female -0.148 0.143 -0.360 -0.458 -0.180
(0.269) (0.359) (0.368) (0.346) (0.325)
IMR 0.249*** 0.361*** 0.687* 0.539 -0.290




Female -0.382** -0.435*** -0.511*** -0.513*** -0.417**
(0.153) (0.162) (0.183) (0.185) (0.195)
IMR 0.004 0.010 0.126 0.109 0.013




Female -0.281*** -0.414*** -0.479*** -0.489*** -0.310**
(0.098) (0.112) (0.153) (0.153) (0.150)
IMR 0.161*** 0.117*** 0.236*** 0.227*** 0.071




e Female 0.475 0.458 0.181 0.204 -0.003(0.506) (0.452) (0.435) (0.463) (0.379)
IMR 0.189* 0.223*** 0.236 0.245 0.060




al Female -0.431*** -0.494*** -0.423** -0.418** -0.424**
(0.140) (0.145) (0.191) (0.184) (0.206)
IMR -0.017 -0.051 -0.197* -0.193* -0.155*




ia Female -0.322 -0.144 -0.154 -0.284 -0.161(0.260) (0.295) (0.390) (0.362) (0.319)
IMR 0.073 0.085 -0.109 -0.137 0.042
(0.086) (0.103) (0.248) (0.272) (0.300)
Notes: This table shows a quantile regression at the 95th percentile of total debt for single households
(only one adult aged 25-60 present). Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
A25
A.9 Collateralized Debt
Table A23: Collateralized debt of single households at the top of the distribution











Female -0.128 -0.047 0.317 0.470 -0.319
(0.622) (0.674) (0.772) (0.865) (0.501)
IMR 0.147 0.130 0.286 0.307 0.091




m Female 0.101 0.156 -0.163 -0.236 -0.278(0.288) (0.324) (0.283) (0.301) (0.263)
IMR 0.109 0.105 0.110 0.041 0.104





y Female -0.305 -0.104 -0.272 -0.231 0.004
(0.268) (0.258) (0.362) (0.368) (0.370)
IMR 0.029 0.039 -0.153 -0.138 -0.075




Female -0.555*** -0.545** -0.559*** -0.562*** -0.583***
(0.167) (0.221) (0.193) (0.184) (0.221)
IMR -0.027 -0.033 -0.053 -0.056 -0.072




Female -0.262 -0.416** -0.414*** -0.471*** -0.305**
(0.175) (0.211) (0.156) (0.143) (0.121)
IMR 0.082* 0.055 0.078 0.083 0.067




e Female 0.136 0.032 -0.003 -0.010 -0.044(0.459) (0.503) (0.364) (0.340) (0.491)
IMR 0.074 0.082 -0.101 -0.085 -0.422




al Female -0.553*** -0.621*** -0.585*** -0.571** -0.691***
(0.191) (0.143) (0.212) (0.245) (0.166)
IMR -0.010 -0.099** -0.245** -0.248*** -0.162*




ia Female -0.339* -0.379* -0.459 -0.518** -0.451(0.180) (0.208) (0.285) (0.263) (0.306)
IMR 0.011 0.006 -0.021 0.036 -0.024
(0.059) (0.071) (0.172) (0.153) (0.149)
Notes: This table shows a quantile regression at the 95th percentile of collateralized debt for single house-
holds (only one adult aged 25-60 present). Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p
< 0.01. Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
A26
A.10 Unsecured Debt
Table A24: Unsecured debt of single households at the top of the distribution











Female -0.577 -0.694** -0.674* -0.698** -0.388
(0.495) (0.305) (0.345) (0.333) (0.405)
IMR -0.012 -0.021 0.256 0.205 1.002




m Female 0.319 -0.278 -0.571 -0.140 0.135(0.743) (0.625) (0.446) (0.442) (0.453)
IMR -0.372 0.118 -0.066 -0.045 -0.132





y Female 0.536 0.643 0.506 0.312 0.239
(0.933) (0.433) (0.478) (0.378) (0.362)
IMR 0.288** 0.321*** 0.331 -0.179 -0.333




Female 0.266 -0.103 0.349 0.413 -0.031
(0.673) (0.527) (0.500) (0.551) (0.371)
IMR 0.111 0.102 -0.027 -0.058 0.046




Female -0.014 -0.366 -0.138 -0.281 -0.034
(0.337) (0.305) (0.301) (0.299) (0.221)
IMR 0.349*** 0.206* 0.626*** 0.659*** 0.273




e Female -0.190 -0.208 -0.507 -0.400 0.121(0.525) (0.594) (0.644) (0.474) (0.493)
IMR 0.113 0.049 0.241 0.202 -0.200




al Female -0.154 -0.353 -0.448 -0.096 -0.350
(0.459) (0.460) (0.537) (0.545) (0.613)
IMR -0.047 -0.107 -0.156 -0.066 -0.246




ia Female -0.606 -0.975* -0.497 -0.604 -0.619(0.476) (0.566) (0.420) (0.490) (0.450)
IMR 0.299* 0.289* 0.274 0.289 0.359
(0.156) (0.169) (0.374) (0.333) (0.412)
Notes: This table shows a quantile regression at the 95th percentile of unsecured debt for single households
(only one adult aged 25-60 present). Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
A27
A.11 Main Residence
Table A25: Value of main residence of single households at the top of the distribution











Female -0.122 -0.407 -0.243 -0.575** -0.332*
(0.321) (0.324) (0.260) (0.239) (0.197)
IMR 0.064 0.028 -0.280 -0.224 -0.313




m Female -0.090 -0.221** -0.264*** -0.166* -0.170*(0.092) (0.098) (0.085) (0.096) (0.088)
IMR 0.082 0.123*** -0.024 -0.006 0.132





y Female -0.567** -0.543** -0.768** -0.553** -0.288
(0.224) (0.251) (0.314) (0.246) (0.221)
IMR 0.080 0.053 -0.059 0.002 -0.203**




Female -0.159 -0.055 -0.021 0.016 0.051
(0.229) (0.171) (0.140) (0.145) (0.159)
IMR 0.000 0.019 0.020 0.005 0.127




Female -0.146 -0.175 -0.195** -0.232** -0.184
(0.149) (0.109) (0.095) (0.098) (0.114)
IMR 0.075*** 0.077*** 0.057 0.047 0.035




e Female -0.335*** -0.283* -0.239 -0.181 -0.141(0.121) (0.157) (0.145) (0.167) (0.154)
IMR 0.025 0.015 -0.004 -0.010 -0.040




al Female 0.072 -0.104 -0.063 -0.080 0.117
(0.438) (0.323) (0.325) (0.315) (0.348)
IMR 0.080** 0.087*** 0.047 0.010 -0.021




ia Female -0.509*** -0.431*** -0.420** -0.401** -0.274(0.153) (0.164) (0.171) (0.192) (0.172)
IMR -0.001 0.062 -0.019 -0.028 -0.065
(0.066) (0.075) (0.151) (0.182) (0.161)
Notes: This table shows a quantile regression at the 95th percentile of main residences for single households
(only one adult aged 25-60 present). Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: HFCS 2010, authors’ calculations.
A28
